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ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
Let us recognize that the Act of State doctrine is in the same
sacred realm as the full faith and credit clause and leave it
alone.
-Michael H. Cardozo, Congress Versus Sabbatino:
Constitutional Considerations
The bottom line is that this confused and outmoded doctrine
frustrates the normal operation of the courts . . . and pro-
duces injustice in individual cases. . . . The courts are
mucking up the act of state [doctrine] all the time.
-Don Wallace, Jr., Statement Before the Subcommittee on
Criminal Law of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
INTRODUCTION
The judicially created act of state doctrine allows United States
courts to abstain from deciding a case involving an international trans-
action on the grounds that one of the actors in the transaction is a
foreign state. Even though the doctrine has spawned a wealth of cases1
and scholarly writings,2 neither courts nor commentators have been
able to agree on the exact scope of the doctrine or the policies underly-
ing its application. The act of state doctrine has been described vari-
ously as a doctrine of judicial prudence' or deference,4 judicial re-
1 A WESTLAW search in December 1985 (ALLFEDS database) using the
search term "act of state doctrine" yielded a list of 207 cases. Many of these cases are
collected and discussed in Annot., 12 A.L.R. FED. 707 (1972 & Supp. 1984).
1 See Information Access Co., Legal Resource Index (microfilm service) (listing
141 entries under this topic as of October 1985). Some notable articles include Henkin,
Act of State Today: Recollections in Tranquility, 6 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 175
• (1967); Mathias, Restructuring the Act of State Doctrine: A Blueprint for Legislative
Reform, 12 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 369 (1980); Zander, The Act of State Doctrine,
53 AM. J. INT'L L. 826 (1959); Comment, The Act of State Doctrine: A History of
Judicial Limitations and Exceptions, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 677 (1977); Note, Rehabil-
itation and Exoneration of the Act of State Doctrine, 12 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
599 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Rehabilitation and Exoneration]. See also Note,
Limiting the Act of State Doctrine: A Legislative Initiative, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 103,
103 n.1 (1982) (collecting authorities) [hereinafter cited as Note, Limiting the Act of
State Doctrine].
3 See International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Comment, Applying an Amorphous Doc-
trine Wisely: The Viability of the Act of State Doctrine After the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act, 18 TEx. INT'L L.J. 547, 551 (1983).
4 See R. FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LE-
GAL ORDER 75, 105 (1964).
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straint,5 judicial abstention,' issue preclusion,7 conflict of laws,8 and
choice of law.9 As a result of all this confusion, courts habitually mis-
apply the doctrine.1 0
First, courts use the doctrine as an excuse to avoid deciding diffi-
cult international transaction cases. Faced with difficult issues in an
international transaction case, courts often simply pronounce that an
act of state is involved and on that basis refuse to render a decision on
the merits. This evasion by the courts has produced bitter reactions
from unsuccessful litigants and scathing criticism from commentators.
Second, use of the act of state doctrine has resulted in violations of
the long-cherished principle of separation of powers." Under our sys-
tem of government, courts have a duty to exercise independent judg-
ment in deciding cases.1 2 The act of state doctrine presents a startling
exception to this rule. Under current practice, if the Executive suggests
that a court apply the act of state doctrine in a particular case, the
court will meekly comply with this suggestion.I' This complete defer-
ence to the Executive enables a litigant with political influence to enlist
the Executive to intercede on its behalf' 4 and tarnishes the image of the
American judiciary as an independent branch of the government.
1 5
5 See Phoenix Canada Oil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 560 F. Supp. 1372, 1381 n.27 (D.
Del. 1983); Laylin, Justiciable Disputes Involving Acts of State, 7 INT'L LAW. 513,
513 (1973); Lillich, Foreward to R. FALK, supra note 4, at vii.
6 See Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 74 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
984 (1977); Mathias, supra note 2, at 372.
7 See National Am. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 448 F. Supp. 622, 640
n.30 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd, 597 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979).
1 See Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48, 51 (5th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980).
9 See Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 705 n.18
(1976); Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
10 See The International Rule of Law Act: Hearing on S. 1434 Before the Sub-
comm. on Criminal Law of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
22, 22-24 (1981) (statement of Professor Don Wallace, Jr., Director of the Interna-
tional Law Institute, Georgetown University Law Center) [hereinafter cited as Act of
State Hearings].
11 See infra notes 305-10 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Ameri-
can tradition of separation of powers and its importance to our democratic system of
government, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 2-1 to 2-4 (1978).
12 Cf. L. TRIBE, supra note 11, at § 2-1 (noting that the different branches of
government act within a "framework ultimately supervised by a disinterested
judiciary").
's See infra notes 270-77 and accompanying text.
14 See First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 792
(1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Judicial deference to the Executive through the act of
state doctrine means that "the fate of the individual claimant would be subject to the
political considerations of the Executive Branch. . . . [Slimilarly situated litigants
would not be likely to obtain even-handed treatment.").
15 "[TIhe Court becomes a mere errand boy for the Executive Branch which may
choose to pick some people's chestnuts from the fire, but not others'." First Nat'l City
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Third, the act of state doctrine has diluted the effectiveness of a
number of important federal laws. The federal antitrust and securities
laws, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,' and the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 197717 have all been undermined by the act of
state doctrine.
Finally, and of primary importance to international legal scholars,
the doctrine is probably the single most important reason for the ar-
rested development of international law in the United States.
When a doctrine produces unfair results, courts often create excep-
tions to ameliorate its unfairness." The same has occurred with the act
of state doctrine. While perhaps alleviating some unfairness, the excep-
tions to the act of state doctrine have also generated a great deal of
confusion. Indeed, even the Justices of the United States Supreme
Court cannot agree on which exceptions to the doctrine should be
recognized."'
Faced with similar situations in the past, courts have taken the
most logical route and abolished archaic doctrines.20 This Article will
describe the numerous problems created by the act of state doctrine and
argue that it too should be abolished, through either judicial or legisla-
tive action. Part I discusses the use of the act of state doctrine by fed-
eral courts. As will be shown, the decisions of these courts have created
considerable confusion about the doctrine, and the confusion seems to
be getting worse with each successive court opinion. Part II sets out the
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 773 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring
in the result). For two recent cases in which the Executive chose to intervene and "pick
some people's chestnuts from the fire," thereby resulting in the reversal of both district
courts' act of state dismissals, see Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de
Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 519-21 (2d Cir. 1985), rev'g 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y.
1983), cert. dismissed, 106 S. Ct. 30 (1985); Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provi-
sional Military Gov't of Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422, 425 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'g
Ethiopian Spice Extraction Share Co. v. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co., 543 F.
Supp. 1224 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
18 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1982).
11 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)-(h), 78dd-1 to -2, 78ff(a), (c) (1982).
18 Tort law furnishes some representative examples. Courts have created various
exceptions and legal fictions to avoid the unfair results produced by the doctrines of
contributory negligence, limited landowner liability, the fellow servant rule, and privity
of contract. See W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEE-
TON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 469-70 (5th ed. 1984) (contributory negligence); id. at
420-22 (limited landowner liability); id. at 572 (fellow servant rule); id. at 682 (privity
of contract).
11 See infra notes 266-303 and accompanying text (discussing the disagreement
that exists throughout the federal courts).
20 A court's abolishment of an archaic legal doctrine is simply an application of
the ancient English common law legal maxim, "Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa
lex" (The reason of the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases.). BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 207 (5th ed. 1979).
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numerous problems that have resulted from application of the doctrine.
Part III suggests that the policy concerns addressed by the vague and
confusing act of state doctrine may be better served by a set of existing
doctrines that have a more clearly defined scope and more secure theo-
retical underpinnings.
On a number of occasions, Congress has attempted to modify or
abolish the act of state doctrine. The American Bar Association has
proposed similar reforms. As noted in part IV, however, these propos-
als have been either too modest or too indirect to accomplish their in-
tended purpose, and the courts have continued to apply the doctrine in
a great number of cases. Part V sets forth a legislative proposal that
would abolish the act of state doctrine in the event that the courts per-
sist in their present course.
I. THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE IN PRACTICE
Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the lower federal
courts have set out fully the meaning and scope of the act of state doc-
trine. As a result, the doctrine has been applied in confusing and some-
times contradictory ways.2' This part will illustrate this confusion by
discussing applications of the doctrine by the judicial and executive
branches of government.
A. The Act of State Doctrine in the Supreme Court:
No Clear Guidance
The United States Supreme Court first recognized the act of state
doctrine in an 1812 case, The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon.22 The
roots of the doctrine, however, can be traced back to seventeenth-cen-
tury England23 and to a common origin with the doctrine of sovereign
21 The ambit of the act of state doctrine has been described as being "so uncertain
that [it] can afford little or no assistance to courts in other countries." Jones, Act of
Foreign State in English Law: The Ghost Goes East, 22 VA. J. INT'L L. 433, 466
(1982).
2 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 146 (1812) (opinion by Marshall, C.J.):
The arguments in favor of [the doctrine] which have been drawn from the
general inability of the judicial power to enforce its decisions in cases of
this description, from the consideration, that the sovereign power of the
nation is alone competent to avenge wrongs committed by a sovereign, that
the questions to which such wrongs give birth . . . are for diplomatic,
rather than legal discussion, are of great weight, and merit serious
attention.
3 The English case of Blad v. Bamfield, 36 Eng. Rep. 992 (Ch. 1674), is often
cited as the common law source for the act of state doctrine. See, e.g., Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964).
In Blad the plaintiff, a Danish citizen, held a patent granted to him by the- King
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immunity.24
During the heyday of European monarchies, the crown enjoyed
complete immunity from suit.25 As monarchies declined, the state re-
placed the king as the sovereign entity, and state sovereignty came to be
personified not by kings, but by state officials. 2 6 While the state was
still protected from suit by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, these
state officials were personally exposed to suit for their official acts. The
act of state doctrine developed in part to provide similar protection from
suit for individual government officials.2 '
Act of state immunity therefore arose as nothing more than a co-
rollary to sovereign immunity.2 8 Sovereign immunity protected the sov-
ereign government against a lawsuit, while the act of state doctrine ex-
tended the same immunity to individual officials acting on behalf of
their government. In The Schooner Exchange, the Supreme Court dis-
cussed the two doctrines together, recognizing the common origin of the
two doctrines as well as the close dependence of act of state immunity
upon sovereign immunity.29
The Supreme Court first treated the act of state doctrine as an
independent source of immunity in an 1897 case, Underhill v. Her-
of Denmark that gave him exclusive trading rights with Iceland. The plaintiff sought to
enforce the patent in England. The English court granted the plaintiff a perpetual
injunction against suits brought by British subjects whose property was seized pursuant
to the patent. In the course of the opinion, the court noted that to allow a court to
determine the validity of the King's patent or a jury to determine whether the English
have a right to trade in Iceland would be "monstrous and absurd." 36 Eng. Rep. at
993.
For a discussion comparing the more expansive use of the doctrine in the United
States with its more limited use in Great Britain, see Buttes Gas & Oil Co. v. Ham-
mer, [1975] 1 Q.B. 557, 572-74, 578-79 (opinions of Lord Denning, M.R., and Ros-
kill, L.J.).
24 For a concise historical discussion tracing the common origin of the two doc-
trines, see Comment, Act of State and Sovereign Immunities Doctrines: The Need to
Establish Congruity, 17 U.S.F. L. REV. 91, 93-94 (1982); see also First Nat'l City
Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 762 (1972) (plurality opinion) (noting
the common origin of the doctrines).
25 See Hill, A Policy Analysis of the American Law of Foreign State Immunity, 50
FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 159 (1981).
28 See Comment, supra note 24, at 93.
27 See id. at 93-94.
28 See M. AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 117
(5th ed. 1984); Note, Rehabilitation and Exoneration, supra note 2, at 600-10. For
recent cases recognizing this origin of the act of state doctrine, see Allied Bank Int'l v.
Banco Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516, 520 (2d Cir. 1985) (noting that the
act of state doctrine was "[o]riginally linked with principles of sovereign immunity"),
and Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Riba, 570 F. Supp. 870, 876
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (stating that early cases viewed the doctrine as "rooted in principles of
sovereign immunity").
29 See 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136.
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nandez.30 The defendant in Underhill was a Venezuelan general who
had taken over the Venezuelan government by force. An American citi-
zen in Venezuela, alleging that the general had caused him damages
immediately after the takeover, brought suit in the United States."1 In
affirming judgment for the defendant, Chief Justice Fuller held that
the general, as head of the de facto Venezuelan government, could not
be held civilly responsible for his treatment of the plaintiff.32 The Chief
Justice referred to the "immunity of individuals from suits brought in
foreign tribunals for acts done within their own States, in the exercise
of governmental authority.""3 Thus, in line with the original formula-
tion of the act of state doctrine as a corollary to sovereign immunity, the
Supreme Court emphasized that the general's acts were allegedly com-
mitted while he was serving in a governmental capacity.
3 4
In the course of his opinion, however, Chief Justice Fuller made a
statement that seemed to extend the scope of the doctrine beyond the
personal immunity rationale. This statement, completely unnecessary to
the disposition of the case,3 5 unfortunately is repeated today in almost
every case involving the act of state doctrine:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence
of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country
will not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of
another done within its own territory. Redress of grievances
by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means
open to be availed of by sovereign powers as between
themselves.3 6
Now referred to as either the "classic American statement" 7 or the
"traditional formulation"3 " of the act of state doctrine, this dictum de-
30 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
31 Id. at 250-51.
32 See id. at 253-54.
3 Id. at 252.
See id. at 253-54.
3 Since the Court's decision rested on grounds of personal immunity, this addi-
tional discussion was superfluous. See Zander, supra note 2, at 830 (characterizing this
language as dictum).
11 Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252. Chief Justice Fuller's statement was not entirely
original; the critical language comes from an earlier New York case, Hatch v. Baez, 14
N.Y. Sup. Ct. 596 (App. Div. 1876), in which the court stated that "the courts of one
country are bound to abstain from sitting in judgment on the acts of another govern-
ment done within its own territory." Id. at 599; see also Zander, supra note 2, at 829
(characterizing this language as "much wider than the case required").
'7 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 416 (1964), quoted in
First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 763 (1972); Com-
ment, supra note 24, at 96 n.45.
3 Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 691 n.7
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tached the doctrine from its personal immunity moorings and allowed it
to drift into uncharted territory. 9
Following Underhill, the Supreme Court began to invoke the act
of state doctrine to dispose of cases on grounds having nothing to do
with the personal immunity of foreign officials. The term was soon
used in connection with the territorial principle of choice of law, which
in the past accorded final authority to sovereigns over disputes occur-
ring within their domains. The rationale for this principle stemmed
from the theory, no longer accepted today, that only the territorial sov-
ereign can create legal rights for persons within its territory.40 This
theory was the basis for the decision in American Banana Co. v.
United Fruit Co.,4  a 1909 antitrust case dealing with the extraterrito-
rial effect of United States antitrust laws. In American Banana, Jus-
tice Holmes held that despite the antitrust laws' seeming application to
conduct outside of the United States, the laws do not apply to "[a] con-
spiracy in this country to do acts [unlawful in this country] in another
jurisdiction . . .if they are permitted by the local law."42
The same rationale accounts for the 1918 decisions in Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co.4 and Ricaud v. American Metal Co.44 These
cases involved disputes over goods that were seized in Mexico by the
Mexican revolutionary government and were later transported into the
United States. In order to determine the rightful owner of the goods,
the Supreme Court had to decide whether the governmental seizure
was lawful. The Court refused to determine the validity of the seizure,
however, because it was effected in a foreign territory by a government
legally recognized by the United States.4 5 Once again applying choice
of law analysis, the Court based its abstention on the grounds that the
legality of the acts of a recognized foreign state is governed exclusively
(1976); Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1533 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en
banc), vacated mem., 105 S. Ct. 2353 (1985). Senator Mathias disapproves of both
terms. See Mathias, supra note 2, at 372.
" Senator Mathias characterizes the holding of Underhill as an "amalgam of
19th-century notions of recognition, of sovereign immunity and of mutual respect
among sovereigns [in which] later jurists perceived a 'formulation' of the act of state
doctrine." Mathias, supra note 2, at 372-73.
40 See Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473, 478-79 (1912); American Banana Co.
v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909); see also Schlesinger, A Recurrent Prob-
lem in Transnational Litigation: The Effect of Failure to Invoke or Prove the Appli-
cable Foreign Law, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 7 (1973) (noting that Justice Holmes was
the major proponent of this now-discarded "vested rights" theory).
41 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
42 Id. at 359.
43 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
44 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
41 See Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 302-04; Ricaud, 246 U.S. at 310.
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by the laws of that state. 46
In Oetjen, the Supreme Court stated another rationale for the act
of state doctrine:
The principle that the conduct of one independent govern-
ment cannot be successfully questioned in the courts of an-
other . . .rests at last upon the highest considerations of in-
ternational comity and expediency. To permit the validity of
the acts of one sovereign state to be reExamined and perhaps
condemned by the courts of another would very certainly
"imperil the amicable relations between governments and
vex the peace of nations.
'47
From the beginning, therefore, the Supreme Court obscured the
exact scope and meaning of the doctrine, using the same term-act of
state-to signify three different reasons for judicial abstention: provid-
ing personal immunity to officials of foreign governments, preserving
territorial choice of law, and avoiding international strife.
The modern act of state doctrine emerged from a trilogy of Su-
preme Court cases decided between 1964 and 1976,8 each dealing with
the nationalization of American assets by Cuba in the aftermath of the
"' Professor John Bassett Moore, a former judge of the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice, long ago criticized the reasoning of these cases:
By no law, national or international, can such a statement be justified; nor
could any statement more vividly exemplify certain erroneous impressions
lately prevailing. The supposition that recognition of any kind "validates
all the actions and conduct" of the government recognized is as startling as
it is novel. Recognition "validates" nothing. On the contrary, it opens the
way to the diplomatic controversion of the validity of any and all "actions
and conduct" that may be regarded as illegal. In the case of governments,
just as in the case of men and women, the recognition of the existence of
an individual entity does not imply, either retrospectively or prospectively,
that its acts are legal.
Moore, The New Isolation, 27 AM. J. INT'L L. 607, 618 (1933) (quoting Oetjen, 246
U.S. at 303).
47 246 U.S. at 303-04 (quoting Underhill v. Hernandez, 65 F. 577, 579 (2d Cir.
1895), affd, 168 U.S. 250 (1897)).
48 Between 1918 and 1964 no significant act of state case was decided, and the
doctrine was cited only sporadically by the courts. See, e.g., United States v. Belmont,
301 U.S. 324, 327-28 (1937) (Underhill, Oetjen, and Ricaud prevent examination of
expropriations by the new Soviet government.); Shapleigh v. Mier, 299 U.S. 468, 471
(1937) (Mexican land expropriation decree must be recognized as valid under those
same cases.). This time period marked the emergence of the doctrine of sovereign im-
munity within the context of trade and commerce. See Lillich, The Proper Role of
Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order, 11 VA. J. INT'L L. 9, 18-27
(1970). It was this doctrine, rather than the act of state doctrine, that courts increas-
ingly began to use in order to avoid reaching the merits of international transaction
cases. See Berizzi Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 571-73 (1926) (recognizing
theory of "absolute" sovereign immunity in the United States).
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Cuban revolution.49 These three cases, together with the above-quoted
language from Underhill and Oetjen, make up the whole of the Su-
preme Court's guidance on the doctrine.
The first and most widely applied case of the three is Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,50 in which the Court was still speaking
with more or less one voice on the doctrine. In Sabbatino, the legal
controversy arose from Cuba's nationalization of American sugar inter-
ests. Banco Nacional de Cuba, the financial agent of the Cuban govern-
ment, sued in federal district court in New York to recover proceeds
from the sale of a sugar shipment that had been sold by an American
company shortly before the company was nationalized by Cuba. The
district court denied Banco Nacional's claim to the sugar proceeds be-
cause the Cuban nationalization decree was retaliatory, discriminatory,
and confiscatory, and therefore violated international law.51 Most im-
portantly, the district court held that, because of the violation of inter-
national law, its examination of the validity of the decree was not
barred by the act of state doctrine.52
The Second Circuit upheld the district court's decision but based
its refusal to apply the act of state doctrine on narrower grounds.53 The
court relied on the Bernstein exception to the act of state doctrine,
which requires courts to follow the will of the Executive when the State
Department informs the court that the doctrine should not be applied.5"
In Sabbatino two letters-written by State Department officers while
the case was on appeal-led the court to conclude that the Executive
49 "Some forty years after the doctrine's first pronouncement by Chief Justice
Fuller in Underhill v. Hernandez, the Cuban revolution and the legal disputes arising
from those events led the Supreme Court to rethink the doctrine." Libra Bank Ltd. v.
Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870, 876 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (tracing the
history of the act of state doctrine).
50 376 U.S. 398 (1964). Professor Lillich describes Sabbatino as "undoubtedly one
of the most important international law cases to be decided by a domestic court [in] this
century." Lillich, supra note 48, at 29.
51 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 193 F. Supp. 375, 384-85 (S.D.N.Y.
1961), affid on other grounds, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 398
(1964). For a critical discussion of the district court's opinion in Sabbatino by a propo-
nent of the act of state doctrine, see R. FALK, supra note 4, at 77-114. See also infra
note 58 (discussing Falk's thesis).
52 See 193 F. Supp. at 381.
'3 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 857-58 (2d Cir. 1962),
rev'd, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
5 See infra notes 270-77 and accompanying text (discussing the exception first
enunciated in Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maat-
schappij, 210 F.2d 375, 376 (2d Cir. 1954)). For analysis of the Second Circuit's Sab-
batino opinion, see R. FALK, supra note 4, at 115-38; Lillich, A Pyrrhic Victory at
Foley Square: The Second Circuit and Sabbatino, 8 VILL. L. REv. 155 (1963); Steven-
son, The Sabbatino Case-Three Steps Forward and Two Steps Back, 57 AM. J. INT'L
L. 97 (1963).
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had no objection to a decision on the merits.55
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Harlan, re-
versed the lower courts. In a wide-ranging and sometimes confusing56
discussion of the act of state doctrine, the Court rejected the district
court's conclusion that a United States court can pass judgment on a
foreign state's local act when that act was committed in violation of
international law.57 The Court refused to examine the validity of
Cuba's expropriation because of what it perceived to be uncertainty in
the applicable standards of international law.58 Following the language
of Underhill, Justice Harlan stated that "the Judicial Branch will not
examine the validity of a taking of property within its own territory-by
a foreign sovereign government ...in the absence of a treaty or other
unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles, even if
5 See 307 F.2d at 857-58.
Subsequent lower court decisions evidence a considerable lack of agreement
about Sabbatino. See infra text accompanying notes 111-223. For incisive criticism of
the Supreme Court's opinion, see Kline, An Examination of the Competence of Na-
tional Courts to Prescribe and Apply International Law: The Sabbatino Case Revis-
ited, 1 U.S.F. L. REv. 49, 54-100 (1966); Lillich, supra note 48, at 31-34.
5' See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427-37.
51 See id. at 428-29. Justice Harlan's notion-that a domestic court should avoid
deciding a case involving an issue of international law if there is insufficient interna-
tional consensus about the proper resolution of the issue-is based on a thesis presented
by Professor Falk while Sabbatino was making its way to the Supreme Court. See R.
FALK, supra note 4, at 64-114; Falk, Toward a Theory of the Participation of Domes-
tic Courts in the International Legal Order: A Critique of Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatiho, 16 RUTGERS L. REv. 1 (1961). Professor Lillich, in his foreword to Falk's
book, comments that Justice Harlan in Sabbatino adopted Falk's analysis "lock, stock
and barrel." Lillich, supra note 5, at vii.
Falk's defense of the act of state doctrine is based in part on the following premise:
"[I]n general, municipal courts should avoid interference in the domestic affairs of other
states when the subject matter of disputes illustrates a legitimate diversity of values on
the part of two national societies." R. FALK, supra note 4, at 72. In those instances,
disputes should be resolved either through "diplomatic pressure" or "supranational re-
view." Id. at 106. Falk argues that judicial deference in such instances would lead to a
stronger and more prestigious international legal order, since (1) domestic courts would
cease to participate in the Cold War and other political rivalries, (2) such political
rivalries would be decided by diplomacy or through supranational forums, and (3) do-
mestic courts could promote the international legal order in areas in which a global
consensus already exists. See id. at 112-14.
While extensive analysis of Falk's thesis is beyond the purview of this Article, it is
worth noting two distinct problems with his approach. First, in the 20 years since the
publication of Falk's thesis it has become apparent that supranational forums, such as
the United Nations and the International Court of Justice, will not adequately develop
international law. See infra notes 336-50 and accompanying text. Thus, greater reli-
ance must be placed on a more active domestic judiciary. Second, neither Falk nor the
Sabbatino Court specified the level of uncertainty in international law sufficient to
justify judicial abstention. As a result, lower federal courts have avoided decisions on
the merits even when there was an international consensus greater than that addressed
by the Court in Sabbatino.
For additional criticism of Falk's thesis, see Kline, supra note 56, at 81-93.
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the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary international
law."59 The opinion suggested that in some circumstances American
courts could determine the validity of such an act, but that such a deter-
mination could be made only on a case-by-case basis, taking into ac-
count "[t]he balance of relevant considerations." 60
In a later portion of his opinion, however, Justice Harlan offered
broad dicta regarding the "constitutional underpinnings" of the act of
state doctrine and the possibility of "embarrassment to the executive
branch" from judicial interpretation of international law.6 Although
Justice Harlan's holding was limited to expropriations, lower courts
have seized upon these broad ruminations as a mandate to dismiss cases
involving a wide variety of foreign transactions having nothing to do
with expropriations.6 2 The formulation found in the early part of the
11 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428. Underhill's "classic statement" was modified by
Justice Harlan to permit judicial scrutiny of a foreign taking when a treaty or or other
unambiguous international agreement supplies a controlling legal standard. This caveat
in Sabbatino has been labeled the "treaty exception" to the act of state doctrine. See
infra text accompanying notes 283-92.
60 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
6 Id. at 432. The argument that courts must not decide cases if the decision
would interfere with the Executive's control over foreign relations-a widely cited ra-
tionale for the act of state doctrine-serves to justify the courts' blind adherence to the
Executive's views on whether the doctrine should be applied. This deference in effect
suspends the constitutionally mandated separation of powers. See infra text accompany-
ing notes 304-09.
In other contexts, however, courts regularly decide cases having potential foreign
policy implications without considering the views of the Executive. The most glaring
example is the law of extradition. The United States, by international custom, will not
grant extradition in the absence of a bilateral treaty between the United States and the
nation seeking extradition (commonly known as the "requesting nation"). Under
United States practice, a federal court, not the Executive, decides whether to honor the
request. The court's role is to interpret the extradition treaty, in effect applying inter-
national law, to determine whether the offense for which the defendant is sought is an
extraditable one under the treaty. Even if the offense is extraditable, the court may still
deny extradition if it finds that the defendant had political motives for committing the
crime.
An extradition decision, of course, may have a significant effect on the foreign
relations of the United States. If the court fails to grant extradition, relations between
the United States and the requesting nation may suffer. Allowing extradition also may
interfere with the Executive's ability to conduct effective foreign policy. Nevertheless,
extradition decisions are consistently made by the judiciary without blind adherence to
the Executive's wishes. If it is reasonable for courts to apply international law to re-
solve the sensitive issues that arise in extradition cases, then they should be able to do
so in other international controversies as well.
For a good discussion of the international law of extradition and its application
both in the United States and abroad, see J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 138-44 (2d ed. 1981); Sutherland, The Development
of International Law of Extradition, 28 ST. Louis U.L.J. 33 (1984).
62 See, e.g., DeRoburt v. Gannett Co., 733 F.2d 701, 703 (9th Cir. 1984) (libel),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 909 (1985); Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 406 (9th Cir. 1983) (bribery), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040
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opinion-requiring case-by-case "balanc[ing] of relevant considera-
tions"-is not cited nearly as often in lower court opinions as the sim-
pler and broader formulation, taken by Justice Harlan from the dictum
in Underhill, that "the courts of one country will not sit in judgment
on the acts of the government of another done within its own
territory."6 3
The next two cases in the trilogy show that Sabbatino, with its
multitude of pronouncements on the act of state doctrine, did not pro-
vide a clear standard for application of the doctrine in future cases.
First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba 64-decided in
1972 and commonly referred to as Citibank-also involved an expro-
priation. The Cuban government seized Citibank branches in Cuba. In
retaliation, Citibank sold collateral securing a loan that it had made to
a predecessor of Banco Nacional de Cuba. Banco Nacional then
brought suit to recover the excess proceeds, and Citibank counter-
claimed seeking to recover damages from the expropriation. Citibank
conceded that the proceeds from the sale of the collateral exceeded the
amount of remaining principal and unpaid interest, but it asserted by
way of setoff that it had a right to keep the excess to compensate for the
confiscation of its property in Cuba. 5 Banco Nacional asserted the act
of state doctrine as a defense to Citibank's counterclaim."
As in the Sabbatino litigation, the lower courts in Citibank issued
confusing statements on the act of state doctrine. The district court
found that Sabbatino would have been controlling but for congressional
actions taken since Sabbatino was decided.6 7 The court focused in par-
ticular on the Hickenlooper amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1964,68 which explicitly permitted the courts, notwithstanding the
act of state doctrine, to reach the merits of cases involving confiscations
by a foreign state.6 9 The court found that this amendment had "for all
(1984); International Ass'n of Machinists v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1359 (9th Cir.
1981) (antitrust), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Frolova v. Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics, 558 F. Supp. 358, 363 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (human rights), affd, 761
F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985); MOL, Inc. v. People's Republic of Bangladesh, 572 F. Supp.
79, 83 (D. Or. 1983) (commercial exportation of rhesus monkeys), affd, 736 F.2d
1326 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 513 (1984); Phoenix Canada Oil Co. v.
Texaco Inc., 560 F. Supp. 1372, 1381 (D. Del. 1983) (oil concession dispute).
63 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 416.
406 U.S. 759 (1972).
68 Id. at 760-61.
66 Id. at 761.
17 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 270 F. Supp. 1004, 1007
(S.D.N.Y. 1969), rev'd, 431 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1970), vacated, 400 U.S. 1019 (1971).
61 Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 301(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1009, 1012-13 (1964) (current ver-
sion at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982)).
69 Id.
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practical purposes" overruled Sabbatino.70 The Second Circuit, on the
other hand, found that the Hickenlooper amendment was not disposi-
tive71 and that Sabbatino barred a decision on the merits of Citibank's
counterclaim.
72
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and held that the
act of state doctrine did not foreclose a decision on the merits." Justice
Rehnquist, in a plurality opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and
Justice White, focused on a letter from the Legal Advisor of the De-
partment of State. This letter informed the Court of the Department's
"'belie[f] that the act of state doctrine should not be applied to bar
consideration of a defendant's counterclaim or set-off against the Gov-
ernment of Cuba in this or like cases.' ",74 Justice Rehnquist found this
directive from the Executive sufficient to prevent application of the act
of state doctrine. While he referred to the separation of powers argu-
ment of Sabbatino as the rationale for the doctrine-implying that ab-
stention from cases involving an act of state is a constitutional impera-
tive 5 --he stated later in the opinion that the only purpose of the
doctrine was to prevent embarrassment to the executive branch. 8 In
light of this purpose, he reasoned, when the Executive indicates that the
act of state doctrine should not be applied, as it had done in the case at
bar, the Court should automatically defer to the Executive's wishes and
find the act of state doctrine inapplicable.77 This is the Bernstein ex-
ception to the act of state doctrine, 8 which, Justice Rehnquist said,
70 270 F. Supp. at 1007.
71 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. First Nat'l City Bank, 431 F.2d 394, 399-402
(2d Cir. 1970), vacated, 400 U.S. 1019 (1971). The Second Circuit issued two separate
opinions in this case. It first reversed the district court, see id., but the Supreme Court
on appeal remanded the case to the Second Circuit for reconsideration in light of the
State Department's statements about the case. See 400 U.S. at 1019. On remand, the
Second Circuit again decided to reverse the district court. See Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. First Nat'l City Bank, 442 F.2d 530, 532 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd, 406 U.S. 759
(1972).
72 See 431 F.2d at 394-95.
See Citibank, 406 U.S. at 770. The five Justices who agreed with the result,
however, could not agree on the reasons why the act of state doctrine should not be
applied. See infra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
74 Citibank, 406 U.S. at 764 (quoting letter from State Department). The full text
of the State Department's letter is appended to the Second Circuit's second Citibank
opinion. See 442 F.2d at 536-38.
" See Citibank, 406 U.S. at 765-67.
78 See id. at 769-70.
17 See id. According to Justice Rehnquist, "[T]his [is] no more than an applica-
tion of the classical common-law maxim that '[t]he reason of the law ceasing, the law
itself also ceases.'" Id. at 768 (quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 288 (4th ed.
1941)).
78 See infra notes 270-77 and accompanying text.
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"we of course adopt and approve."''
As the plurality decision in Citibank makes clear, the difference
between the results in Sabbatino and Citibank, which both concerned
Cuban expropriations, is primarily attributable to the different posi-
tions taken by the Executive in the two cases.80 In Sabbatino, the Solic-
itor General filed an amicus brief before the Supreme Court in which
he argued that the act of state doctrine should be applied in that case."
Conversely, in Citibank, the State Department wrote a letter urging the
Court to refrain from applying the doctrine.8 2
Only Chief Justice Burger and Justice White, however, accepted
Justice Rehnquist's proposition that the Executive may, at its option,
determine whether a court will adjudicate a controversy. Justice Doug-
las preferred to rely on the equitable argument that "fair dealing re-
quires allowance of the setoff to the amount of the claim on which this
suit is brought."83 Justice Powell concurred in the Court's judgment
but explicitly rejected the positions of Justices Rehnquist and Doug-
las.84 In Justice Powell's view, the courts have a duty to hear all cases
like Citibank "[u]nless it appears that an exercise of jurisdiction would
interfere with delicate foreign relations conducted by the political
branches."8 5 Thus, Justice Powell concurred in the judgment of Ci-
tibank not because the Executive gave its "permission,"8" but because
on the Citibank facts he saw no conflict between the political and judi-
cial branches.8 7 Justice Powell also expressed his displeasure with the
"broad holding of Sabbatino," which, he stated, "was not compelled by
the principles ...which underlie the act of state doctrine."88
In a strongly worded dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun, refused to recognize the Bernstein
exception. According to Justice Brennan, to do so would be to abdicate
the courts' role in enforcing the separation of powers and to allow
71 Citibank, 406 U.S. at 768.
80 See Citibank, 406 U.S. at 764-65, 767.
81 See infra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
83 See Citibank, 406 U.S. at 764.
83 406 U.S. at 772 (Douglas, J., concurring in the result) (citing National City
Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 365 (1955)). The force of Justice Douglas's
argument did not go unnoticed by Justice Rehnquist, who felt compelled, at the end of
his plurality opinion, to comment that "the result we reach is consonant with ...
[Republic of China]." 406 U.S. at 768.
See Citibank, 406 U.S. at 775 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
85 Id.
88 "1 would be uncomfortable with a doctrine which would require the judiciary
to receive the Executive's permission before invoking its jurisdiction." Id. at 773.
87 See id. at 776.
88 Id. at 774 (footnote omitted).
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politics, not law, to dictate judicial results.8 9 He asserted that even a
"cursory" reading of Sabbatino belied Justice Rehnquist's view that
the act of state doctrine functions only to prevent embarrassment to the
Executive."0 Instead, Justice Brennan argued, the doctrine compels ju-
dicial abstention for reasons related to the political question doctrine,
and the potential of embarrassment to the Executive is merely
one-and not necessarily the most important-factor evidencing the ex-
istence of a "political question."'"
To Justice Brennan, therefore, the political question doctrine and
the act of state doctrine are ultimately equivalent. Justice Brennan even
attributed this view to Sabbatino, although Justice Harlan's opinion
did not make that formulation. 2 Justice Brennan also did not explain
why the act of state doctrine is necessary at all if cases can be resolved
through the political question doctrine.
The fractured opinion in Citibank offers little guidance to lower
federal courts. Three Justices-Burger, White, and Rehnquist-
wanted to follow Sabbatino, as limited by the Bernstein exception. One
Justice-Powell-was ready to reject Sabbatino. Four other justices-
Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun-wanted to adopt a new
approach that equated the act of state doctrine with the political ques-
tion doctrine, but they did not explain why the act of state doctrine
then needed to be discussed. Six Justices-Douglas, Brennan, Stewart,
Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell-had doubts about the applicability
of the Bernstein exception, even though the State Department had
written a letter to the Court asking that the case be adjudicated. Five of
those Justices-all but Douglas-rejected the Bernstein exception out-
right. Citibank perfectly illustrates the widespread disagreement and
confusion that exists in the Supreme Court (and lower federal courts)
regarding the act of state doctrine.
The trilogy ends with Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic
of Cuba,93 decided in 1976. In Dunhill, the Court again was unable to
muster a majority view for a particular application of the act of state
8 See Citibank, 406 U.S. at 790-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90 See id. at 785.
91 See id. at 787-88. The other factors pointed out by Justice Brennan were
the absence of consensus on the applicable international rules, the unavail-
ability of standards from a treaty or other agreement, the existence and
recognition of the Cuban Government, the sensitivity of the issues to na-
tional concerns, and the power of the Executive alone to effect a fair rem-
edy for all United States citizens who have been harmed.
Id.
92 See id. at 787-88.
, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
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doctrine; as a result, no single rule or guideline emerged from the case.
The Court in Dunhill considered, but did not conclusively determine,
the validity of another exception to the act of state doctrine-the so-
called "commercial exception."
The proceedings in Dunhill grew out of the Cuban government's
nationalization of five privately owned cigar manufacturers. After the
nationalization, "interventors" named by the Cuban government to take
control of the seized Cuban concerns continued to ship cigars to Ameri-
can importers, including Dunhill. The former owners of the Cuban
companies, most of whom had fled to the United States following the
expropriation, sued Dunhill in federal district court for trademark in-
fringement and for the value of the cigars that the interventors had sold
to Dunhill. The issue in the case was whether the act of state doctrine
was implicated by the interventors' refusal to reimburse the importers
for sums that the importers had paid to the interventors rather than the
former owners.
94
As in the previous cases in the trilogy, the lower federal courts
could not agree on the application of the doctrine. The district court
refused to apply the doctrine,9" while the court of appeals held that the
doctrine applied to a portion of the debt. 96
The Supreme Court again was unable to come up with a majority
view on an important issue connected with the act of state doctrine. By
a five to four vote, the Court refused to apply the doctrine on the nar-
row grounds that no act of state had been proven, since the interventors
had not shown that their repudiation was a "public act of those with
authority to exercise sovereign powers.197 The Court's judgment was
based on two narrow propositions: (1) the interventors had the burden
of proving that their actions were acts of state; and (2) the evidence
submitted by the interventors was insufficient to satisfy this burden.98
The Court's agreement was limited to these two propositions.
While Justice White's plurality opinion stated that "[wie decline to ex-
" See id. at 685-88.
" See Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y.
1972), modified sub nom. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973),
rev'd sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682
(1976).
" See Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd sub nom.
Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
' Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 694. In arguing for the plaintiff in Frolova v. Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, 558 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. 111. 1983), affd, 761 F.2d 370 (7th
Cir. 1985), Professor Anthony D'Amato, a noted international legal scholar, asserted
that Dunhill abolished the act of state doctrine. See id. at 363. The court strongly
disagreed with him on this point, stating that "[tihe majority in Dunhill expressed no
doubt as to the [doctrine's] continuing validity." Id.
98 See Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 691-95.
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tend the act of state doctrine to acts committed by foreign sovereigns in
the course of their purely commercial operations,"99 only three other
Justices-Burger, Powell, and Rehnquist-agreed with this proposi-
tion; 00 a majority of the Court declined to endorse this "commercial
exception" to the act of state doctrine.101
Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justices
Brennan, Stewart, and Blackmun. The dissenters disagreed with the
majority's conclusion that, because "'[n]o statute, decree, order or reso-
lution of the Cuban Government itself was offered in evidence,' "1102 the
expropriation was not an act of state. Justice Marshall argued that an
act of state need not take any particular form1 3 and could include even
the passive conduct represented by the "interventors' retention of and a
refusal to return funds paid to them by Dunhill."' 04 He also disagreed
with Justice White's recognition of a commercial exception to the act of
state doctrine. According to Justice Marshall, "The carving out of
broad exceptions to the doctrine is fundamentally at odds with the care-
ful case-by-case approach adopted in Sabbatino."'0 5
In Dunhill, as in the other cases, the Supreme Court asked the
State Department for its views on application of the act of state doc-
trine. In response, the State Department urged that Sabbatino be over-
ruled and strongly intimated that the doctrine should be abolished.0 6
Ironically, as Justice Marshall pointed out in his dissent,'0 when Sab-
batino was before the Supreme Court the Executive urged just the op-
posite. 0 8 This time, however, all of the Justices, including Justice
Rehnquist, seem to have ignored the State Department's opinion. 09
99 Id. at 706.
100 See id. at 684.
101 Rejecting the commercial exception were Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice O'Connor, who replaced Justice Stewart, may now be
the crucial "swing vote" in the Court's next act of state case.
102 Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 718 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Dunhill, 425
U.S. at 695).
10. See id. at 719-20.
'0 Id. at 716.
10 Id. at 728. Justice Marshall did not rule out the selective use of the commer-
cial exception in future cases: "In the final analysis . . .it is unnecessary to consider
whether the exception would be responsive to the concerns underlying the act of state
doctrine in every case to which it might apply." Id. at 728-29 (footnote omitted).
109 See id. at 696-98, 706-11; see also infra notes 237-41 and accompanying text.
The State Department expressed this view in understated terms: "[Ilt is our view that
if the Court should decide to overrule the holding in Sabbatino so that acts of state
would thereafter be subject to adjudication in American courts under international law,
we would not anticipate embarrassment to the conduct of the foreign policy of the
United States." Id. at 710-11.
107 See id. at 725 n.10 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
108 See infra notes 229-31 and accompanying text.
109 Justice Rehnquist's response is, of course, inconsistent with his earlier opinion
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The Court retained the doctrine, although a majority of the Justices did
find the doctrine inapplicable to the facts of Dunhill.
Such is the confused state of act of state doctrine in the Supreme
Court. The Justices cannot agree on the meaning of the doctrine, on
the role the Executive should play in its application by the courts, or on
the status of the various exceptions to the doctrine.10 Not surprisingly,
this disagreement in the Supreme Court is mirrored in the lower fed-
eral courts.
B. The Act of State Doctrine in the Lower Federal Courts: Discord
Among and Within the Circuits
The Supreme Court, with its opinions primarily limited to cases it
accepts by a grant of certiorari, has dealt with the act of state doctrine
only in limited circumstances. The Sabbatino /Citibank /Dunhill tril-
ogy, together with the older Oetjen and Ricaud cases, dealt with the
doctrine in one factual setting: expropriations by foreign governments.
The Underhill case involved the older act of state problem of govern-
mental immunity. Thus, Supreme Court cases reveal only the tip of the
iceberg of the act of state doctrine.
One of the most alarming aspects of the doctrine is the potential
breadth of its application to American jurisprudence."' The decisions
of the lower federal courts illustrate that the act of state doctrine might
be invoked whenever a claim arises that involves events outside of the
United States. For example, many United States laws have an extrater-
ritorial component." 2 The act of state doctrine can prevent the rightful
application of these laws outside of United States borders." 3 The doc-
trine also can prevent the resolution of disputes between private parties
doing business abroad."' Since international business transactions are
in Citibank, in which he urged that the Executive's recommendations on the act of state
doctrine be dutifully followed. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
"I This lack of consensus probably explains why for the last decade the Supreme
Court, despite disagreement among the circuits, has consistently declined to review sig-
nificant decisions on the act of state doctrine.
... See, e.g., cases cited supra note 62 (illustrating the variety of act of state
cases).
"' On the extraterritorial effect of United States antitrust and securities laws, see
infra notes 319-26 and accompanying text (antitrust laws); infra notes 327-29 and
accompanying text (securities laws). On the extraterritorial effect of United States pat-
ent, trademark, and copyright laws, see Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 283-
87 (1952); American Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n, 701 F.2d 408,
412-16 (5th Cir. 1983); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406,
426-29 (9th Cir. 1977); Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633, 641-43 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956).
118 See infra notes 319-35 and accompanying text.
'1' See, e.g., Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 712 F.2d
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becoming increasingly common, and since foreign governments usually
have some involvement in these transactions,"' seemingly every inter-
national business dispute may be rendered nonjusticiable by the act of
state doctrine. Unlike the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the act of
state doctrine may be applied even if a foreign government is not a
party in a case.
116
In addition, the act of state doctrine undermines predictability, a
primary goal in business transactions. When private parties do business
with a foreign government, they can arrange contractually for the sov-
ereign to waive the defense of sovereign immunity.1 1 7 The parties can-
not, however, contractually preclude the later application of the act of
state doctrine, since the court may apply the doctrine sua sponte. Thus,
in international business transactions, the act of state doctrine presents
a trap that-even if anticipated by the parties to the transac-
tion-cannot necessarily be avoided.
While every federal circuit except the Tenth Circuit has issued act
of state opinions, some circuits have had a greater influence in shaping
the doctrine. Because the Second Circuit includes New York, the center
of international business, it has issued the most act of state opinions.118
The Ninth Circuit-which includes the West Coast international busi-
ness centers, San Francisco and Los Angeles-has also issued impor-
tant act of state pronouncements. In addition to opinions from these
two circuits, an opinion from the Third Circuit has received considera-
ble attention. Finally, the District of Columbia Circuit recently issued a
comprehensive act of state opinion that may be widely cited in the
future.
404 (9th Cir. 1983); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 984 (1977).
115 See authorities cited note 250 infra; cf. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 703 ("Participa-
tion by foreign sovereigns in the international commercial market has increased sub-
stantially in recent years. The potential injury . . . from a system in which some of the
participants in the international market are not subject to the rule of law has therefore
increased correspondingly.") (citation omitted).
I1" See THE LAW OF TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSAcTIONS 10-33 (V.
Nanda ed. 1984).
117 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1982) (waiver of sovereign immunity under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act).
18 A WESTLAW search in December 1985 (CTA database) using the search
command "act of state doctrine" yielded 31 cases decided by the Second Circuit. Its
closest competitor was the Fifth Circuit, with 22 cases. The Second Circuit's special
influence spans the entire history of the doctrine in the United States. The first Ameri-
can act of state case was adjudicated in New York, see supra note 38, and the Supreme
Court's three most recent act of state cases-Sabbatino, Citibank, and Dun-
hill-originated in the Second Circuit, specifically in the Southern District of New
York.
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1. The Second Circuit
The best-known Second Circuit case discussing the act of state
doctrine is Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp."9 Hunt, an independent oil pro-
ducer, alleged that Mobil and six other major oil companies conspired
among themselves and with Libya to eliminate him as their competitor
in Libya, in violation of United States antitrust laws. According to
Hunt, the seven oil companies encouraged him not to negotiate with the
Libyan government of Colonel Qadhafi concerning his oil concession in
Libya. The oil companies allegedly knew that if he held firm against
Libyan governmental pressure, Libya would nationalize his oil conces-
sion, thereby leaving the defendant oil companies to divide among
themselves Hunt's former share of the market.120 Following Libya's ex-
propriation of his assets, Hunt sought antitrust damages against the
defendant oil companies under the Sherman Act and the Wilson Tariff
Act.
12 1
In his pleadings, Hunt neither directly challenged the validity of
the Libyan government's action nor joined the Libyan government as a
defendant.1 22 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit dismissed Hunt's claim
on the basis of the act of state doctrine. The court found that in order
to evaluate Hunt's claims properly it would need to examine the mo-
tives of the Libyan government in expropriating Hunt's concession.
Since this would inevitably involve a determination of the validity of
the Libyan act, the court held that the act of state doctrine required
judicial abstention.12 3
119 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
120 Id. at 70-72. "The efforts of the [Hunt] brothers to reach all parties possibly
involved against their interests in oil from Libya have become litigation legend in their
own time." J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, supra note 61, at 406. For an
account of the Hunt oil litigation, see Note, Sherman Act Jurisdiction and the Acts of
Foreign Sovereigns, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 1247, 1259-62 (1977).
121 Hunt, 550 F.2d at 70 (citing section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1982), and section 73 of the Wilson Tariff Act, 15 U.S.C. § 73 (1982)).
122 See id. at 72-75.
23 See id. at 76-78. The broad and inflexible approach of Hunt has been criti-
cized by other courts. See Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300, 304 n.5 (3d
Cir. 1982); Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo, S.A. v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322, 325
(5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041 (1983); Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v.
Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48, 55 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980);
Sage Int'l Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 902-08 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
Even within the Second Circuit, some district courts have attempted to distinguish
Hunt rather than follow its drastic approach. See, e.g., Rasoulzadeh v. Associated
Press, 574 F. Supp. 854, 857-60 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
Perhaps the most mechanical application of the Hunt rule occurred in DeRoburt
v. Gannett Co., 733 F.2d 701 <9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 909 (1985).
Plaintiff DeRoburt was the elected president of Nauru, one of the Marshall Island
republics. He sued Gannett, a newspaper company, for publishing an allegedly libelous
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The problem with the Hunt analysis is that in the great majority
of international transaction cases a foreign sovereign has some cogniza-
ble ownership or regulatory interest. Since such cases inevitably must
be resolved by examining the sovereign's motivations, the Hunt analysis
precludes adjudication in the United States of most international trans-
action cases.
In Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nige-
ria,"" another panel of the Second Circuit took an entirely different
view of the act of state doctrine. Texas Trading involved Nigeria's
massive default in 1981 on its numerous international contracts to
purchase cement. In contrast to Hunt, the foreign sovereign in Texas
Trading, Nigeria, was itself the defendant in the case; moreover, in
order to determine the legality of Nigeria's repudiation of the contract,
the court had to examine Nigeria's motivations. The Second Circuit,
however, in an opinion by Judge Kaufman, concluded in a single foot-
note that the act of state doctrine would not prevent adjudication of the
dispute.1 25 Curiously, to support his argument against application of
the doctrine, Judge Kaufman cited Justice Marshall's argument that
the doctrine should have been applied in Dunhill.1 26 Judge Kaufman
took to heart Justice Marshall's call for a "careful case-by-case analysis
of the extent to which the separation of powers concerns ...are im-
plicated by the action before the court" 127 and determined that in this
case application of the act of state doctrine would be inappropriate.
In the same year, the Second Circuit also decided Empresa
Cubana Exportadora de Azucar y Sus Derivados v. Lamborn &
Co.1 28 The Empresa Cubana panel, however, reverted to a more dog-
matic approach to the act of state doctrine.1 29 Empresa Cubana was
article accusing him of making an illegal loan. Citing Hunt and its successor cases, the
district court dismissed the suit on act of state grounds, finding that the lawsuit would
inevitably require an analysis of DeRoburt's motivation in making the loan. This result
is absurd: the sovereign in DeRoburt invited an examination of his motivations, thereby
precluding any possibility of embarrassment to United States foreign relations. Since
the potential for such embarrassment is the only reason why motivations of a foreign
sovereign cannot be examined, this case did not present an appropriate occasion for
applying the act of state doctrine.
124 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982).
125 See id. at 316 n.38.
126 See id. (citing Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 728 (Marshall, J., dissenting)).
217 Id. Judge Kaufman took the same reasoned approach to the act of state doc-
trine in Associated Container Transp. (Austl.) v. United States, 705 F.2d 53, 62 (2d
Cir. 1983), allowing a federal antitrust investigation to proceed despite objections by
private foreign firms that the investigation amounted to questioning the validity .of their
sovereign governments' actions.
128 652 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1981).
129 The American Bar Association issued a report in 1984 that proposed amend-
ing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
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another case involving Cuba's expropriation of property owned by
United States citizens. Lamborn was a sugar broker and a partner in
Lamborn, Craig & Co. (Craig). Acting as Craig's agent, Lamborn
bought sugar from the predecessor in interest of Empresa Cubana, a
company wholly owned by the Republic of Cuba. Five percent of the
purchase price was still unpaid when the Cuban government seized
Craig's assets; as in Dunhill, an interventor was appointed to adminis-
ter the expropriation. The Republic of Cuba then initiated a suit
against Lamborn, Craig's assignee, to recover the unpaid sums. After
the district court permitted the Republic of Cuba to amend its com-
plaint so as to substitute Empresa Cubana as plaintiff, Lamborn coun-
terclaimed based on Cuba's expropriation.
1 3
1
The district court held that the act of state doctrine prevented it
from hearing Lamborn's counterclaim. 3 The appellate court agreed,
even though it acknowledged that Empresa Cubana's activities were
wholly commercial in nature."3 2 The court focused on the expropriation
rather than on the parties' sugar transactions. Finding the expropria-
tion to be a noncommercial act, the court held that the act of state
doctrine prevented it from reviewing the merits of the parties'
dispute.1"'
Thus, in Empresa Cubana the Second Circuit seemed to follow
both the broad formulations of the Hunt decision and the dissents in
Dunhill and Citibank, all of which argued for abstention in cases in-
volving expropriations by foreign governments.1 '
2. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit, like the Second Circuit, has made conflicting
statements regarding the act of state doctrine. Modern Ninth Circuit
1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(0, 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1982), to prevent the act of state doctrine
from limiting the effectiveness of the FSIA. See infra text accompanying notes 406-10.
That report cites Empresa Cubana as an example of a case that misapplied the doc-
trine. See Report on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 1984 A.B.A. SEc.
INT'L L. PRAC. 2. For other critical analyses of the Empresa Cubana case, see Com-
ment, supra note 24, at 107-10; Note, Limiting the Act of State Doctrine, supra note 2,
at 118-20.
130 See 652 F.2d at 233-34.
131 See id. at 235.
132 See id. at 233, 237-38.
133 See id. at 238-39.
13, Curiously, Judge Kaufman was one of the judges on the Empresa Cubana
panel. It is unclear how he could reconcile his narrow interpretation of the act of state
doctrine in Texas Trading and Associated Container Transp. (Austl.) v. United States,
705 F.2d 53 (2d Cir. 1983), with his later accession to the much broader interpretation
of the doctrine in Empresa Cubana.
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law on the doctrine was first enunciated in a 1976 case, Timberlane
Lumber Co. v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Associa-
tion.385 Timberlane, an American milling manufacturer, sued Bank of
America for allegedly entering into a conspiracy with the government of
Honduras to ruin its operations in that country."8' Like the defendants
in Hunt, Bank of America sought to use the act of state doctrine to
prevent the court from hearing the case. The district court dismissed
the case on act of state grounds, but the Ninth Circuit reversed.
187
At the outset of its opinion, the Ninth Circuit made an important
point about the doctrine: "It is apparent that the [act of state] doctrine
does not bestow a blank-check immunity upon all conduct blessed with
some imprimatur of a foreign government."' 8 With this in mind, the
court then examined the conduct that Bank of America claimed called
for abstention on act of state grounds. The court found that the conduct
that Bank of America had characterized as an exercise of Honduran
sovereignty consisted of judicial proceedings initiated against the plain-
tiff by a private party, not by the Honduran government." 9 The court
also noted that Timberlane did not name Honduras or any government
official as a defendant. For these reasons, the court concluded that the
lawsuit would not threaten relations with a foreign state.'40 According
to the court, the touchstone of the act of state doctrine, as recognized in
Sabbatino, is the potential for interference with American foreign pol-
icy.141 Since the court did not find a potential for such interference in
this lawsuit, it ruled that the act of state doctrine was inapplicable. 42
Thus, the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane took a flexible view of the
act of state doctrine. First, the court made clear that there is less need
235 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
: See id. at 601.
t See id. at 615. Timberlane's victory, however, was short-lived. When the case
was remanded to the district court to determine whether the Sherman Act's extraterri-
torial provisions applied to the case, the district court held that they did not, and again
dismissed the suit. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. See Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 574 F. Supp. 1453 (N.D. Cal. 1983),
affd, 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984). The Ninth Circuit did not mention the act of
state doctrine in its affirmance; rather, it mechanically applied the factors listed in the
first Timberlane decision for determining whether a foreign-based transaction should
be subject to the Sherman Act. The court found that dismissal was warranted because a
majority of those factors weighed against application of the Sherman Act to the Hondu-
ran events in Timberlane, even though both parties were American entities. See 749
F.2d at 1382-86. In effect, defendant Bank of America obtained through Sherman Act
analysis what it could not obtain by means of the act of state doctrine.
138 549 F.2d at 606.
119 See id. at 608.
140 See id.
141 See id. at 605-06.
142 See id. at 608.
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for application of the doctrine when the defendant is not the foreign
sovereign itself, but only a private party having some involvement with
the foreign sovereign. 1 4 This distinction, of course, would likely reduce
the frequency with which the act of state doctrine is applied in litiga-
tion involving foreign parties. Second, in contrast to American Banana
and Sabbatino, the court did not even address the legality of the Hon-
duran government's acts under local or international law.4 Third, al-
though the Timberlane court included the need to examine the motiva-
tion of the sovereign as one factor in its analysis, the court did not treat
this question as dispositive. 145 Finally, the court took into account the
importance of the United States' interest in enforcing extraterritorial
applications of its antitrust laws. According to the Timberlane view, the
courts should enforce such laws unless enforcement would damage the
foreign relations of the United States.'46
The flexible approach taken up by the Ninth Circuit in
Timberlane did not prevail long. In 1981, it was replaced by a more
dogmatic approach, developed in International Association of Machin-
ists (1AM) v. OPEC.147 The OPEC opinion presents a comprehensive
discussion of the act of state doctrine, and for this reason remains one of
the most widely cited act of state cases.' 48 Moreover, since the Supreme
Court has not issued a decision on the act of state doctrine for almost
ten years-since the 1976 Dunhill decision-the OPEC case has be-
come, by default, the most recent detailed pronouncement on the doc-
trine. Unfortunately, OPEC is a good example of judicial misuse of the
doctrine, and with its wide acceptance it is a major contributor to the
existing confusion in this area.
In OPEC, IAM, a labor union, sued OPEC and its member na-
tions for alleged violations of United States antitrust laws. Specifically,
IAM claimed that OPEC's fixing of the world-wide prices of oil vio-
lated section one of the Sherman Act, and it sought monetary damages
and injunctive relief under sections four and five of the Clayton Act.
1 49
143 See id.
144 See id. at 605-08.
141 See id. at 606-08.
148 See id. at 613-15.
147 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
148 Most act of state decisions today cite OPEC. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 803, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1354
(1985); Associated Containers Transp. (Austl.) v. United States, 705 F.2d 53, 61 (2d
Cir. 1983); Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 546-48 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
"'I See OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1355-56 (citing section one of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1982), and sections four and five of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15-16
(1982)). For a discussion of the United States antitrust laws and their relationship to
the act of state doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 319-26.
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However, according to the OPEC court, IAM's lawsuit enmeshed the
court in the world of petro-politics and thus presented it with a di-
lemma. If, on the one hand, the court declared the OPEC nations' price
fixing to be illegal, the decision would amount to a "domestic court
instructing a foreign sovereign to alter its chosen means of allocating
and profiting from its own valuable natural resources, ' 150 which the
court was unwilling to do. If, "[o]n the other hand, . . . the court
[should] hold that OPEC's actions are legal, this 'would greatly
strengthen the bargaining hand' of the OPEC nations in the event that
Congress or the executive chooses to condemn OPEC's actions. 151
Faced with the dilemma of how to avoid deciding the case, the federal
district court and the Ninth Circuit took different routes.
The district court disposed of the case by stating tjhat it lacked
jurisdiction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976
(FSIA). 52 The FSIA governs the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal
and state courts in actions against foreign sovereigns stemming from
their commercial and private law activities.15 The district court rea-
soned that jurisdiction was lacking because OPEC's price fixing
amounted to control over natural resources and thus was a public
rather than a commercial function.'" However, the district court's
analysis was incorrect. Under the FSIA, the test for determining
whether an act is commercial is objective: it does not involve inquiry
into the purpose of the act.155 Since the sale of oil on the worldwide
market is a purely commercial activity, jurisdiction under the FSIA is
clearly established, regardless of the activity's underlying public
purpose.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit seemed to recognize the district
150 OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1361.
... Id. (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 432).
152 See International Ass'n of Machinists (IAM) v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553, 569
(C.D. Cal. 1979) (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1604, 1605(a)(2) (1982)), affd, 649 F.2d 1354
(9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982). For a more detailed discussion of
the FSIA and its relationship to the act of state doctrine, see infra text accompanying
notes 312-18.
158 The FSIA grants this jurisdiction by denying the sovereign immunity defense
to foreign sovereigns when their actions involve commercial or private law activities. See
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1605(a)(2)-(a)(3), (a)(5) (1982).
1 See 477 F. Supp. at 567-68, discussed in OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1358.
165 Section 1603(d) of the FSIA, which defines commercial activity, specifically
requires "reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or
act, rather than . . . reference to its purpose." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1982); see also
H.R. REP'. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6604, 6615 (stating that under the FSIA the purpose of an activity is "irrel-
evant" in determining if its nature is commercial) [hereinafter cited as FSIA HOUSE
REPORT].
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court's error.1"' Rather than reversing the district court's decision, how-
ever, it affirmed by relying on the act of state doctrine. 5 In an opinion
by Judge Choy,' the appeals court initially held that the doctrine was
not superseded by the FSIA.'59 First quoting out of context a portion of
the legislative history of the Act, 60 and then citing an outdated legisla-
tive report,' the court incorrectly held that, despite passage of the
FSIA, Congress desired to retain the act of state doctrine.' 62 Under the
court's much-criticized' two-step analysis, a finding that the FSIA
confers subject-matter jurisdiction does not end the inquiry. The court
must then determine, apart from the FSIA jurisdictional grant, whether
15 See OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1358.
157 See id. at 1358-62.
15 Curiously, five years earlier Judge Choy authored the Timberlane opinion,
which took a much more flexible approach to the act of state doctrine. See supra text
accompanying notes 138-46.
158 See OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1359-60.
160 In order to establish support for its view that the FSIA was not meant to
supersede the act of state doctrine, the OPEC court quoted part of a footnote from the
1976 FSIA HOUSE REPORT, supra note 155, that addressed the relationship between
the FSIA and the act of state doctrine. See OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1359. The full sentence,
with the portion omitted from OPEC italicized, reads as follows: "The [joint House-
Senate] Committee has found it unnecessary to address the act of state doctrine in this
legislation since decisions such as that in the Dunhill case demonstrate that our courts
already have considerable guidance enabling them to reject improper assertions of the
act of state doctrine." FSIA HOUSE REPORT, supra note 155, at 6619 n.1 (emphasis
added). By failing to quote the entire sentence from the Report, OPEC falsely implied
that the FSIA drafters wanted to retain an activist act of state doctrine. In fact, as the
entire sentence shows, the FSIA drafters did not deal with the act of state doctrine
because they felt that the majority in Dunhill had already severely limited it.
61 The OPEC court improperly relied on a passage from a 1973 House Report
stating that the FSIA "in no way affects existing law concerning the extent to which
the 'act of state' doctrine may be applicable in similar circumstances." See 649 F.2d at
1359-60 (discussing IMMUNITIES OF FOREIGN STATES: HEARINGS ON H.R. 3493
BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON CLAIMS AND GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS OF THE
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1973)). This passage was
rendered obsolete by the 1976 House Report, in which the
committee . . . emphasize[d] that [the] section-by-section analysis [of the
1976 legislation] supersedes the section-by-section analysis that accompa-
nied the earlier version of the bill in the 93d Congress; the prior analysis
should not be consulted in interpreting the current bill and its provisions,
and no inferences should be drawn from differences between the two.
FSIA HOUSE REPORT, supra note 155, at 6611.
182 See OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1360.
16s See, e.g., Kestenbaum, Antitrust's "Extraterritorial" Jurisdiction: A Progress
Report on the Balancing of Interests Test, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 311, 329 (1982);
Comment, supra note 24, at 105-07; Comment, Antitrust Law-International
Law-Act of State Doctrine-Foreign Antitrust Violations-International Association
of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC), 27 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1013, 1040 (1982); Comment, Act of State Doctrine:
Applicability of United States Antitrust Law-International Association of Machinists
& Aerospace Workers v. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, 23 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 117, 122-23 (1982).
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the act of state doctrine would nonetheless bar the lawsuit.'" As a re-
suit, the court severely restricted the effectiveness of the FSIA. In effect,
under the court's analysis, what the foreign sovereign cannot get
through the "front door" of the FSIA, it obtains through the "back
door" of the act of state doctrine.10 5 Courts both in the Ninth Circuit
and other circuits have now begun to cite OPEC's expansive approach
to the act of state doctrine as an easy means to avoid deciding difficult
cases.
106
Even if one accepts this "two hurdles" approach, the court's dis-
cussion in OPEC fails to shed much light on the act of state doctrine. In
applying the doctrine, the court did not explain its meaning or scope.1 67
Rather, after reciting the "classic formulation" of Underhill6 and
paying homage to Sabbatino,16 9 the court went through a litany of fac-
tors that it said must be considered under the act of state doctrine and
that in OPEC precluded adjudication of the suit. First, the petro-poli-
tics questions in OPEC raised the potential for interference with United
States foreign policy.' Second, the suit concerned issues in which both
the executive and legislative branches were already "intimately in-
volved.""" Third, there was an absence of international consensus on
the suit's legal issues; price fixing, like expropriation, is not illegal
164 The drafters of the FSIA felt that the OPEC "two hurdles" approach would
never be adopted by courts, since the Executive specifically argued in Dunhill against
this "back door" use of the doctrine. See FSIA HOUSE REPORT, supra note 155, at
6619 n.1. Time, however, has proven the FSIA drafters wrong, as courts, despite the
prohibitive language of Dunhill, continue to apply the doctrine widely and to use
OPEC's "two hurdles" analysis.
The American Bar Association is now recommending the addition of a new section
to the FSIA specifically removing the act of state defense when jurisdiction under the
FSIA is present. This change would destroy the "two hurdles" approach of OPEC. For
a discussion of the ABA proposal, see infra text accompanying notes 406-10.
165 The phrase "back door" appears in the FSIA House Report, which warns
against this very use of the act of state doctrine. The House Report finds it inappropri-
ate for courts to deny jurisdiction through "'the back door, under the guise of the act of
state doctrine,'" when jurisdiction under the FSIA is available. FSIA HousE REPORT,
supra note 155, at 6619 n.1 (quoting Amicus Brief of the United States at 41,
Dunhill).
16 See, e.g., Callejo v. Bancomer, S.A., 764 F.2d 1101, 1113 n.12 (5th Cir. 1985);
MOL, Inc. v. People's Republic of Bangladesh, 572 F. Supp. 79, 83-84 (D. Or. 1983),
affd, 736 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 513 (1984); Frolova v. Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, 558 F. Supp. 358, 363-364 (N.D. Ill. 1983), affd, 761
F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1985).
167 Curiously, the OPEC court itself impliedly criticized the doctrine by labeling it
"amorphous." 649 F.2d at 1359. In the next breath, however, the court applied this
"amorphous" doctrine to the case before it. See id. at 1359-62.
168 See id. at 1358 (discussing language quoted supra text accompanying r/ote 38).
169 See id. at 1359.
170 See id. at 1359-61.
171 See id. at 1361.
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under the laws of many countries. 17 2 Fourth, the suit involved oil, a
natural resource, which sovereign states have inherent power to pre-
serve and protect for their own people.173 Finally, the commercial na-
ture of the sovereigns' activities in the case did not automatically pre-
clude application of the act of state doctrine. According to the OPEC
court, while a commercial activity exception limits the doctrine of sov-
ereign immunity, there is no such exception to the act of state doctrine;
when the courts must avoid an affront to state sovereignty, "the act of
state doctrine remains available . . . regardless of any commercial
component of the activity involved."' 4 How these factors work together
to create a cohesive doctrine was not explained by the court. Because
the court failed to provide guidance on the meaning and scope of the
doctrine, later courts were left to ponder what, if any, rule of law may
be discerned from the OPEC opinion.
Moreover, the court's reasons for invoking the act of state doctrine
are unpersuasive. The potential for interference with the Executive's
conduct of United States foreign affairs is not a valid ground, in and of
itself, for avoiding a decision on the merits. First, the FSIA dictates that
American courts may not rely on sovereign immunity doctrine to dis-
miss United States-related disputes involving international commerce,
even if such disputes have the potential, as many times they do, for
affecting United States foreign policy.175 Second, courts have not shied
away from deciding other questions that have major foreign policy im-
plications. A good example is international extradition. Under Ameri-
can law, the courts decide whether the United States should honor ex-
tradition requests from foreign governments. Each time a court rules on
the validity of an extradition request by a foreign sovereign, it steps
into the sensitive arena of foreign relations, with the potential for em-
barrassing the Executive; yet courts decide these cases freely and with-
out deference to the Executive.17 ' Finally, virtually every international
172 See id.
178 See id.
174 Id. at 1360. A subsequent Ninth Circuit court was reluctant to adopt the
OPEC position on this point. See Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental Petroleum
Corp., 712 F.2d 404, 408 (9th Cir. 1983) (asserting that the "Ninth Circuit has not
definitely ruled on the commercial exception"), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
178 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)-(a)(3) (1982); FSIA HOUSE REPORT, supra note
155, at 6605-06, 6617-18. Moreover, even under a broad interpretation of the act of
state doctrine, courts will adjudicate disputes involving property located in the United
States regardless of potential embarrassment to the Executive or interference with
United States foreign policy. See infra notes 297-300 and accompanying text.
176 For a more detailed discussion of the law of extradition, see supra note 61.
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dispute may involve a foreign sovereign in some respect. 177 Taken to its
logical conclusion, the OPEC decision, like the Second Circuit's Hunt
decision, would close American courts to all international disputes in
the interest of avoiding embarrassment to our foreign policy.
The court's other rationales-that it should not judge OPEC's acts
because they involve regulation of a national resource and because there
is no international consensus on this issue-are likewise unpersuasive.
The OPEC nations' international sales of oil and fixing of prices, un-
like the foreign acts of expropriation in Sabbatino, are purely commer-
cial in nature. If the OPEC nations wish to enter world commerce, and
act not like nations but like private traders, then they should be treated
as such. I"' International law, with its adherence to the "restrictive"
theory of sovereign immunity179 and the distinction between "public
law" (nations acting in their sovereign capacity) and "private law" (na-
tions acting in their private, commercial capacity), 80 would seem to
support such treatment. 1 '
177 Cf Castro v. Saudi Arabia, 510 F. Supp. 309, 312 (W.D. Tex. 1980):
The transaction at issue here could be broadly defined as the "sale of
services" and so be deemed "commercial." But the activity could also be
narrowly viewed as a non-profit agreement between two governments for
the training of military personnel. So viewed, the transaction would be
public or governmental, and protected by sovereign immunity.
178 See Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 703-04 (White, J., concurring):
Participation by foreign sovereigns in the international commercial market
has increased substantially in recent years. . . . The potential injury to
private businessmen-and ultimately to international trade itself-from a
system in which some of the participants in the international market are
not subject to the rule of law has therefore increased correspond-
ingly .... In their commercial capacities, foreign governments do not ex-
ercise powers peculiar to sovereigns. Instead, they exercise only those pow-
ers that can also be exercised by private citizens. Subjecting them . . . to
the same rules of law that apply to private citizens is unlikely to touch
very sharply on "national nerves."
179 See FSIA HOUSE REPORT, supra note 155, at 6605; J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER
& N. LEECH, supra note 61, at 301-11.
80 FSIA HOUSE REPORT, supra note 155, at 6605; J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER &
N. LEECH, supra note 61, at 311-24.
181 How, then, should the OPEC case have been decided? Rather than relying on
a variety of disoriented pronouncements gleaned from other cases applying the act of
state doctrine, and in the process severely interfering with the effectiveness of the FSIA,
the court could have decided the case by actually examining the antitrust claims that
the union brought against OPEC. In so doing, the court would have found that the
plaintiffs' antitrust action was improper. As the district court had already found, see
477 F. Supp. at 561, the union could not obtain monetary damages against OPEC and
its member nations because of the indirect-purchaser rule of Illinois Brick Co. v. Illi-
nois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). Plaintiffs were left, therefore, only with the possibility of
obtaining injunctive relief. However, even a cursory examination of the OPEC nations'
allegedly wrongful acts indicates that injunctive relief could not be obtained under the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. First, OPEC is not a "person" within the meaning of the
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The Ninth Circuit's confusion about the act of state doctrine in the
aftermath of OPEC is illustrated by Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occi-
dental Petroleum Corp.18 2 Clayco involved a suit between two Ameri-
can oil companies, one (Clayco) accusing the other (Occidental) of ob-
taining a valuable offshore oil concession from the sovereign Arab
sultanate of Umm Al Qaywayn by paying bribes to the sultan. Clayco
claimed that Occidental's payment violated the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act of 1977 (FCPA). 83
Defendant Occidental maintained that the act of state doctrine
prevented adjudication of Clayco's allegations. The defendant relied in
part on the disposition of an earlier case involving a similar dispute:
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co.'" In that action,
Occidental accused Clayco and Buttes of bribing a neighboring sultan
to obtain his aid in the contest for the oil concession. According to Occi-
dental, Clayco and Buttes sought to induce the sultan to assert a terri-
torial claim that would have prevented Occidental from obtaining oil
rights in the area. The Buttes court never reached the merits of Occi-
dental's claim; invoking the act of state doctrine, it dismissed the
case.
185
The Ninth Circuit reached the same result in Clayco, but in doing
so it did not appear to be following any well-defined rule of law. Be-
cause of the vague nature of the doctrine and the conflicting signals
given by the Supreme Court and by the Ninth Circuit itself in
Sherman Act. See 3 J. VON KALINOVSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULA-
TIONS § 7.02[1], at 7-29 (1984) (An association, though not defined under the Sher-
man Act, "is generally defined by common law to be an organization of persons.").
Second, the allegedly wrongful conduct does not come within the extraterritorial cover-
age of the antitrust laws. See Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust &
Say. Ass'n, 749 F.2d 1378, 1382-86 (9th Cir. 1984); Leigh, Act of State Doc-
trine-Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act-Judicial Restraint in Foreign Policy
Arena, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 160, 162 (1982). Without resort to the Sherman and Clay-
ton Acts, the plaintiffs have no remedy, since cartels are not prohibited under interna-
tional law. See Act of State Hearings, supra note 10, at 30. Thus, the OPEC nations'
activities are probably legal under both American and international law.
The OPEC court, therefore, could have easily disposed of the case on its merits.
Such a disposition, contrary to the court's view, would not have had a different effect
on congressional or executive efforts to condemn the OPEC nations' policies than a
disposition of the case on act of state grounds. Either way, the action fails, and the
OPEC nations probably would not appreciate the difference. The effect on foreign rela-
tions would thus be minimal.
182 712 F.2d 404 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984). The case is
summarized in 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 446-49 (1984).
'83 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)-(h), 78dd-1 to -2, 78ff(a), (c) (1982). For a
further discussion of the FCPA, see infra text accompanying notes 330-35.
184 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), affd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
185 See id. at 113.
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Timberlane and OPEC, the court could do little more than to compare
the facts before it with those of other act of state cases. The court found
that the sovereign involvement here was more substantial than in
Timberlane but comparable to that in Buttes.186 Moreover, the court
asserted that in order to decide the case it had to examine the motiva-
tion of the foreign sovereign in taking the bribe, which it was unwilling
to do.187 The court also recognized that decisions within the Ninth Cir-
cuit are in conflict on the recognition of the "commercial activity" ex-
ception to act of state doctrine.188 The court suggested, however-citing
the four-member plurality opinion in Dunhill'8 9-that even if such an
exception does exist, it is limited to situations in which governments are
not exercising powers unique to sovereigns.'90 According to the court,
the governmental action in Clayco (granting oil concessions), unlike the
action in Dunhill (debt repudiation accompanying the nationalization
of foreign assets), could not have been taken by a private citizen and
therefore came within the purview of the act of state doctrine."' 1 Of
course, the court was mistaken; clearly the activity in Dunhill also
could not have been taken by a private citizen.
Finally, the court was willing to abrogate the private enforcement
mechanisms of the FCPA. Although the court recognized that the
FCPA permits actions by private parties,19 2 it held that these actions
are not available when a foreign government is involved.1 93 Since any
FCPA action inevitably involves payment by a private party to an offi-
cial of a foreign government, foreign sovereigns will always be involved
in private lawsuits brought for violation of the FCPA. Under the
Clayco reasoning, therefore, a private lawsuit for violation of the FCPA
is apparently barred.
3. The Third Circuit
One of the most frequently cited opinions on the act of state doc-
trine outside of the Second and Ninth Circuits is Mannington Mills,
Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,'" decided by the Third Circuit in 1979.
188 See Clayco, 712 F.2d at 406-07.
187 See id.
188 See id.
188 See id. at 408 (citing Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 704).
190 See id. In effect, the Clayco court adopted the strict view of the Second Cir-
cuit's Hunt case, applying the act of state doctrine to avoid examining the motivations
of a foreign sovereign.
181 See id.
182 See id. at 409.
193 Id.
194 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
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Mannington Mills, an American manufacturer of floor material, al-
leged that Congoleum, a competitor, had fraudulently obtained foreign
patents and, in violation of antitrust laws, was threatening to use these
patents against it in infringement actions abroad. 19 5 In its defense, Con-
goleum claimed that Mannington's antitrust action was barred by the
act of state doctrine." 6 The district court agreed with Congoleum and
dismissed the case.
1 97
The Third Circuit reversed. Following the flexible approach of
the Ninth Circuit in Timberlane, 98 the court refused to apply the act
of state doctrine, despite the fact that adjudication would force the court
to judge both the validity of the foreign act and the foreign govern-
ment's motivation. 9 The court also acknowledged that "enforcement
of a decree might possibly present problems of international rela-
tions."2 00 Nevertheless, the court was willing to examine such govern-
mental activities because it did not accept the defendant's "proposition
that the mere issuance of patents by a foreign power constitutes . . .
an act of state, as that term has developed under case law."20 1 Accord-
ing to the court, "The grant of a patent is quite different from an act of
expropriation by a government."20 2
Mannington Mills, although praised by one commentator for its
"flexible approach" to the act of state doctrine,2 0 3 unfortunately did not
set out clear standards for future application of the doctrine. For exam-
ple, the court did not elucidate the distinction, for purposes of the doc-
trine, between a government's act of expropriation and a government's
issuance of a patent. Both, of course, involve purely sovereign activity.
Moreover, if the defendant obtained the foreign patent through fraud,
then its conduct is similar to the activity of the defendant in Clayco, °4
in which the defendant acted improperly to obtain an oil concession. It
is difficult to understand why the act of state doctrine permits examina-
tion of one activity while precluding examination of the ofher.
195 Id. at 1290.
196 Id.
197 The district court reasoned that "the validity of the foreign patents was to be
determined by the courts of the respective issuing nations." Id.
198 See supra notes 138-46 and accompanying text.
199 See Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1290.
200 Id. at 1294.
201 Id. at 1293-94.
202 Id. at 1294.
203 See Comment, supra note 3, at 560.
204 See supra text accompanying notes 182-93.
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4. The District of Columbia Circuit
In 1984, the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en banc, issued
its opinion in Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger.2 0 5 An American
Bar Association report has called the opinion's act of state discussion
"excellent" and "monumental. '20 6 Because the opinion contains a
wide-ranging discussion of the doctrine and was issued en banc, it may
be widely discussed, and perhaps frequently cited, in the future.
The plaintiff in Ramirez was an American citizen who owned a
14,000-acre cattle ranch in Honduras. Unbeknownst to him, the United
States government, with the permission of Honduras, picked his land as
the site for the training of Salvadoran soldiers. According to the plain-
tiff, the American military constructed a military center housing more
than 1,000 soldiers and began conducting training exercises using live
ammunition.
207
Unable to convince the American military to leave, the plaintiff
brought suit in district court against the Secretaries of State and De-
fense, seeking to enjoin them from trespassing on his property. He al-
leged that the military facility was built on his ranch without constitu-
tional or statutory authority and that the occupation had deprived him
of the use and enjoyment of his property without due process of law.
The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss the
suit on the grounds that it presented a nonjusticiable political question
involving United States foreign policy in Central America.'0 A panel
of the District of Columbia Circuit, in a two-to-one decision,
affirmed.209
In a six-to-four decision, the full circuit reversed the panel.2 10 The
court, in a lengthy opinion by Judge Wilkey, first rejected the district
court's reliance upon the political question doctrine to dismiss the
case.211 While the court acknowledged that the plaintiff's suit raised
205 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), vacated mem., 105 S. Ct. 2353
(1985).
208 ABA AD Hoc COMMITTEE ON THE ALI RESTATEMENT OF THE FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, COMMENTS ON SECTIONS 428 AND 429 OF
THE DRAFT RESTATEMENT (THE ACT-OF-STATE DOCTRINE) 4 (1984).
207 See Ramirez, 745 F.2d at 1507.
208 See Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 568 F. Supp. 1236, 1238-40 (D.D.C.
1983), rev'd en banc, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated mem., 105 S. Ct. 2353
(1985).
209 See Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 724 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1983), rev'd
en banc, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated mem., 105 S. Ct. 2353 (1985).
210 For a contemporary report on the case, see Honduran Cattle Rancher Wins
Round Against U.S., Nat'l L.J., Oct. 22, 1984, at 9, col. 1.
211 See Ramirez, 745 F.2d at 1511-15. The original Ramirez panel reached the
same conclusion. See 724 F.2d at 147.
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some foreign policy considerations, it characterized the task before it as
a purely judicial function: determining whether the taking of property
of an American citizen by the federal government was constitutionally
proper.2"2 The fact that the property was located in Honduras was
inconsequential.
Next, the court disagreed with the panel's suggestion that injunc-
tive relief would impair the Executive's conduct of foreign affairs in
Central America. The full court felt that carefully tailored equitable
relief could avoid this problem.21
In the last section of the opinion, the court held that the defendant
was not entitled to a dismissal on act of state grounds and remanded
the case to the district court. Noting that "[s]eparation of powers con-
cerns are the underpinnings of the act of state doctrine," 21 4 it held that
a successful act of state defense requires two showings: first, that an act
of state has occurred, and second, that the case does not fall within any
legally recognized exception to the doctrine. 1 5
The court found, on the record before it, that neither showing had
been made. According to the court, the defendant proved that Honduras
had taken steps toward expropriating the rancher's property. But be-
cause the expropriation was not complete, the court did not view it as
an act of state sufficient to compel dismissal of the case.21 6 The court
further stated, in dicta, that the United States would probably be un-
able to refute the assertion of exceptions to the doctrine.217 For in-
stance, an existing treaty between the United States and Honduras
guaranteeing payment for any expropriations of American-owned prop-
erty could bring this case within the "treaty exception" enunciated in
Sabbatino.
2 8
However, because the act of state defense had not been raised
212 See 745 F.2d at 1515-20.
"la See id. at 1521-33.
214 Id. at 1534.
215 See id. at 1534-43. Ramirez is the first case to employ this two-step analysis as
a means of deciding act of state cases.
216 See id. at 1536.
217' See id. at 1539-42.
... For a discussion of the treaty exception, see infra text accompanying notes
283-92. The court brought up two other possible bars to application of the doc-
trine-the first and second Hickenlooper amendments. See infra notes 393-98 and ac-
companying text. Neither, however, would have been effective as a bar. As Judge
Starr's dissent correctly pointed out, see 745 F.2d at 1572-74, the first Hickenlooper
amendment does not require a cutoff of aid to an American ally such as Honduras, and
even if it did, that would have no effect on the act of state analysis. The second Hick-
enlooper amendment, contrary to the court's suggestion, has been uniformly interpreted
to apply only to expropriated property that is transported into the United States. See,
e.g., cases cited infra note 398. This, of course, did not occur in Ramirez.
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before the district court, the majority felt that it would be inappropriate
for the court of appeals to determine whether the doctrine was applica-
ble. It therefore remanded the case to the district court.
21 9
The Ramirez dispute may finally be resolved through the political
process. Following the full Circuit's opinion, the United States appar-
ently decided to close the military center because Honduras was
preventing it from training Salvadoran soldiers there.2  Subsequently,
the Supreme Court, in a one paragraph order, vacated the court of ap-
peals' opinion and remanded the case for reconsideration "in light of
the Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act .. .
and other events occurring since October 5, 1984 [the date of the Ra-
mirez decision].
' '221
Despite these developments, the Ramirez opinion remains impor-
tant. Its detailed and comprehensive argument for a strict construction
of the act of state doctrine provides an essential counterweight to the
broad applications of the doctrine by the Second and Ninth Circuits in
Hunt and OPEC, respectively. In contrast to these decisions, Ramirez
clearly provides that the act of state doctrine should not be invoked
cavalierly whenever some foreign governmental involvement looms in
the background. More importantly, under the Ramirez analysis plain-
tiffs do not have to prove lack of sovereign involvement in international
transaction cases to have their claims adjudicated. Rather, the court
placed the burden of proving the applicability of the act of state doc-
trine on the defendant, requiring the twofold showing described above.
To date, no other court has imposed such prerequisites for application
of the doctrine.
General acceptance of the Ramirez analysis could lead to a much
more limited use of the act of state doctrine.222 However, the Ramirez
decision itself shows the disagreement of the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit on the issue, 22' and perfectly illustrates the discord that currently
exists both among and within the circuits on the act of state doctrine.
219 See Ramirez, 745 F.2d at 1545.
220 See U.S. Will Shut Honduras Base, L.A. Times, Mar. 18, 1985, at 1, col. 3.
221 Weinberger v. Ramirez de Arellano, 105 S. Ct. 2353, 2354 (1985) (mem.).
222 For the most part, the federal district courts have been relying on much
broader formulations of the act of state doctrine. One commentator characterizes the
district courts' treatment of the doctrine as "barring [courtroom] doors at the slightest
suggestion of involvement of a foreign government in a case." Mathias, supra note 2, at
405; see also Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 553 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) ("The
substantial and rapid accumulation of authority in favor of a broadened use of the [act
of state] doctrine as a vehicle for judicial abstention has all taken place in the lower
federal courts . . ").
223 Judge Starr's dissent sharply criticized the majority for "an unsupportably
narrow view of the substance and purpose of [the act of state] doctrine." Ramirez, 745
F.2d at 1566 (Starr, J., dissenting).
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C. Executive Pronouncements on the Act of State Doctrine:
Inconsistent Recommendations
While courts disagree about the exact scope and meaning of the
act of state doctrine, they do agree on one point: the doctrine is based
substantially, if not totally, on deference to the Executive in its conduct
of foreign policy. For this reason, many of the lower courts, 224 and
some Justices of the Supreme Court,225 have been extremely sensitive to
executive pronouncements on the act of state doctrine. The Executive,
recognizing the important role it can play in influencing a court's deci-
sion whether to dismiss on act of state grounds, has not shied away
from making its position known. Unfortunately, the Executive has
taken inconsistent positions on the applicability of the doctrine, thereby
sending out confusing and contradictory signals.
In 1963, while Sabbatino was before the Second Circuit,226 the
executive branch made its first major pronouncement on the act of state
doctrine. In that year, the State Department issued two letters on the
subject, including one that strongly intimated that the doctrine should
not be applied in Sabbatino.227 The Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's rejection of the doctrine, primarily in reliance on those letters.228
However, a year later, when Sabbatino came before the Supreme
Court, the Executive reversed its position, urging in a brief filed by the
Solicitor General the retention of a strong and wide-ranging act of state
doctrine.229 While Justice Harlan's opinion in Sabbatino never ex-
224 See, e.g., Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't of
Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422, 424 (6th Cir. 1984); Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 857-58 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
225 In Citibank, for example, three Justices explicitly adopted the Bernstein ex-
ception. See 406 U.S. at 768.
228 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
22 The text of the letters is reproduced in the Sabbatino circuit court opinion. See
307 F.2d at 858.
228 See id. at 858-59.
221 See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Sabbatino, reprinted in 2
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1009 (1963). Professor Richard Falk at the time commented
on the Executive's position as follows:
As the amicus brief of the United States government now makes evident,
the lower federal judges, who had explained the suspension of normal def-
erence under the act of state doctrine as something that could (and perhaps
should) be done to carry out the wishes of the executive, were in error.
The executive did not want the act of state doctrine suspended. This dis-
closes that the faulty notion of judicial subservience was also mistaken in
fact, since the wrong message was received. The courts were not entitled
and were certainly not requested, according to the executive, to examine
the validity of these Cuban acts of state.
R. FALK, supra note 4, at 117.
The Second Circuit recently committed this same error-incorrectly anticipating
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pressly acknowledged that the Court was following the recommenda-
tion of the Executive, 23 0 its formulation of the act of state doctrine mir-
rored the position expressed in the Solicitor General's brief.23'
By the time the Citibank case was decided, in 1972, the Executive
was taking a less expansive position on the doctrine. In a letter submit-
ted while Citibank was before the Supreme Court,23 2 the State Depart-
ment urged that the doctrine not be applied whenever either (1) the
Executive so advises the judiciary-arguing, in effect, that the Court
should adopt the Bernstein exception2 33 or (2) the private litigant's
claim seeks only a setoff against a foreign sovereign's claim, and certain
other conditions are met.234 The Citibank letter referred to the rise in
the 1960's of expropriations of American assets by foreign govern-
ments.235 These "[r]ecent events," the letter strongly implied, called for
a less expansive application of the act of state doctrine than that set out
in Sabbatino.
28
In 1976, by the time of the Dunhill decision, the Executive had
made a complete turnabout from its position in Sabbatino. In a letter
that the State Department filed in Dunhill,237 the Executive urged that
(1) the doctrine not be applied in that case;238 (2) the Bernstein and
the Executive's position on the act of state doctrine-in Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco
Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985). In Allied Bank, the district
court applied the act of state doctrine to deny the plaintiff's motion for summary judg-
ment in a suit against Costa Rican banks. See Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito
Agricola de Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440, 1444 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), rev'd, 757 F.2d 516
(2d Cir. 1985). The court reasoned that failure to apply the act of state doctrine might
subject the Executive to embarrassment in its dealings with Costa Rica. See id. The
Second Circuit initially affirmed but, on rehearing, vacated its original order and re-
versed the district court. The court explained that its turnabout was in response to the
filing of an amicus brief by the Justice Department. The brief stated, contrary to the
court's initial supposition, that the Executive viewed the banks' repudiation of their
debts as contrary to United States policy. See Allied Bank, 757 F.2d at 519.
230 See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 420.
231 Compare Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 430-32 with Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae, Sabbatino, supra note 229, at 1018. See also Stevenson, The State
Department and Sabbatino-"Ev'n Victors Are By Victories Undone," 58 AM. J.
INT'L L. 707, 707-08 (1964) (Sabbatino adopted the State Department's position "with
a vengeance.").
232 For the full text of the State Department letter, see Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. First Nat'l City Bank, 442 F.2d 530, 536-38 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd, 406 U.S. 759
(1972).
233 Id. at 537.
234 See id. The State Department reaffirmed this position in 1973 and 1980 Bern-
stein letters. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875,
884 (2d Cir. 1981).
211 See 442 F.2d at 537.
236 See id.
2s See Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 706-11 (appendix 1 to the opinion of Justice White).
238 See id. at 707, 710.
1986]
364 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
commercial activity exceptions be recognized;"3 9 and (3) Sabbatino be
overruled.240 Indeed, the Executive strongly intimated that the doctrine
should be abolished altogether.
2 41
The Executive's last major input into the act of state doctrine oc-
curred in a 1982 Sixth Circuit case, Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co.
v. Provisional Military Government of Socialist Ethiopia.2 42 In the so-
called "Robinson letter" (named after its author, State Department Le-
gal Adviser Davis Robinson),24 3  which was submitted to the
Kalamazoo court, the Executive no longer mentioned disagreement
with Sabbatino or urged abolition of the doctrine.2 44 The letter re-
quested that the judiciary follow the Executive's views on when the
doctrine should be applied, 245 but added that in a case in which there
exists an applicable legal standard, such as that provided by a treaty,
the Executive would make its wishes known only if it felt that foreign
policy concerns required judicial abstention. 246 The Robinson letter re-
vealed the Executive's bias against the act of state doctrine by stressing
that a "broad, inflexible rule of abstention in expropriation cases is not
necessary to safeguard our foreign policy interests.
247
An examination of the Executive's changing views on the act of
state doctrine, from Sabbatino in 1964 to Kalamazoo Spice in 1982,
illustrates a number of important points. First, the Executive, like the
courts, has not expressed a clear and consistent view of the act of state
doctrine. Second, and more importantly, the Executive, unlike the
courts, is a political branch of the government, and therefore its pro-
239 See id. at 707.
240 See id. at 710.
241 See id. at 709-10. The entire tone of the letter leads one to conclude that the
State Department wished the doctrine abolished. The State Department even pointed
out that other nations, including Great Britain, do not recognize the act of state doc-
trine with respect to violations of international law and yet do not suffer serious judicial
interference with their foreign policy. See id. at 710.
242 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984).
24' Letter from Davis R. Robinson to Solicitor General Rex E. Lee (Nov. 19,
1982), reprinted in 22 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 207 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Robinson letter]. The Sixth Circuit in Kalamazoo Spice-apparently influenced by the
Executive's amicus brief, which incorporated the gist of the Robinson letter-reversed
the district court's act of state dismissal on the grounds urged in the brief. Kalamazoo
Spice also illustrates how the Bernstein approach may lead to the unequal treatment of
litigants. Without the Executive's intervention in the case, it seems probable that the
Sixth Circuit would have merely affirmed the district court's opinion.
244 See Robinson letter, supra note 243.
241 "If we indicate that adjudication would be inconsistent with foreign policy in-
terests of the United States, we trust that the court will give appropriate weight to our
views." Id. at 208. This statement, of course, indirectly urges courts to adopt the Bern-
stein exception to the act of state doctrine.
246 See id.
247 See id.
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nouncements on the doctrine have been based on political expediency.
When the Executive found that the doctrine would serve its purposes,
as it did during the Sabbatino litigation, it promoted the doctrine.
Later, when it found a court's use of the doctrine not to its liking, it
urged its outright abolition or major curtailment. The only consistency
in its positions, from Sabbatino to the present, is that in each case it
has urged courts to adopt a policy of automatically following its
recommendations.
As a result of its inconsistent pronouncements, the Executive has
been a major culprit in creating judicial confusion about the act of state
doctrine. Without the Executive's involvement, the judiciary might by
now have formulated a workable and consistent doctrine for interna-
tional transaction cases.248
II. SOWING THE SEEDS OF CONFUSION: PROBLEMS CREATED BY
THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
As the above discussion reveals, there is a great deal of confusion
about the act of state doctrine in practice. The courts have been unable
to determine its scope or to construct a consistent scheme for its appli-
cation.249 This confusion has produced cases with unfair results, atten-
uated the reach of important federal legislation, and stymied the devel-
opment of international law. This section will discuss in more detail the
numerous problems created by the application, or more correctly, the
misapplication, of the act of state doctrine.
A. Fostering Widespread Confusion
1. Disagreement About the Meaning and Scope of the Doctrine
Part of the confusion about the act of state doctrine may stem from
the simple fact that the term "act of state" is a misnomer: virtually any
governmental action can be characterized as an act of state. Almost
every international transaction today has some link to a foreign govern-
214 The related doctrine of sovereign immunity also was hopelessly confused dur-
ing the period when the Executive offered the courts its suggestions on when to apply
it. Under that regime, as with the act of state doctrine today, politics, and not the rule
of law, dictated whether sovereign immunity would be applied. In response, Congress
in 1976 passed the FSIA, whose major purpose was to abolish the old Executive-dic-
tated approach to sovereign immunity and replace it with a doctrine to be shaped solely
by the courts, without Executive interference. For background on the FSIA and its
effect on the doctrines of sovereign immunity and act of state, see infra notes 312-18
and accompanying text.
29 For an example of a foreign scholar's frustration in trying to understand the
act of state doctrine, see Jones, supra note 21, at 466.
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ment,250 and therefore every such transaction that generates a dispute
can lead to application of the doctrine.
Of course, the courts have recognized the impropriety of such a
result and have attempted to limit their use of the doctrine to situations
in which the foreign sovereign's involvement is significant.25' The prob-
lem, however, is that courts have been unable to agree on how much
involvement is necessary to trigger the doctrine's application. In Dun-
hill, for instance, a majority of the Supreme Court felt that without an
official decree repudiating the interventors' obligations there was not
enough sovereign involvement to warrant dismissal.2 52 In Ramirez de
Arellano v. Weinberger,253 the District of Columbia Circuit held that,
even if the president of a foreign country has officially decreed an ex-
propriation, no "act of state" has occurred until the expropriation has
been completed. 254 Yet in cases in which the foreign government's in-
volvement was much less direct than in Dunhill and Ramirez-such as
Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp.255 and Clayco Petroleum Corp. v. Occidental
Petroleum Corp.,2 56 which involved only the background presence of
foreign governments-the act of state doctrine has been applied.
Faced with the difficulty of trying to determine the extent of for-
eign governmental activity necessary to constitute an "act of state,"
most courts have focused primarily on whether adjudicating the contro-
versy might interfere with the foreign policy of the United States.
257
The Ninth Circuit's decision in International Association of Machin-
250 In most nations of the world, including some western democracies, the govern-
ment owns either all or a large part of the nation's economic enterprises. In addition,
most governments are intimately involved with their country's foreign trade. As a re-
sult, almost all international disputes involve a foreign government to some degree. See
generally D. LAMONT, FOREIGN STATE ENTERPRISES (1979); R. MONSEN & K.
WALTERS, NATIONALIZED COMPANIES: A THREAT TO AMERICAN BUSINESS (1983);
STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE IN THE WESTERN ECONOMIES (R. Vernon & Y. Aharoni
eds. 1981); The State in the Market, ECONOMIST, Dec. 30, 1978, at 37.
251 See, e.g., Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 694-95; Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger,
745 F.2d 1500, 1537-38 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), vacated mem., 105 S. Ct. 2353
(1985); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1293-94 (3d Cir.
1979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 549 F.2d
597, 608-09 (9th Cir. 1976).
252 See Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 694-95.
253 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), vacated mem., 105 S. Ct. 2353
(1985).
254 Id. at 1534-36.
255 550 F.2d 68, 72-75 (2d Cir. 1977); see also supra notes 119-23 and accompa-
nying text.
256 712 F.2d 404, 407-08 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984); see
also supra notes 182-93 and accompanying text.
257 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 139-40, 170 & 200; infra text accom-
panying note 306.
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ists (IAM) v. OPEC"'8 articulated this rationale when it refused to de-
cide whether OPEC's price-fixing activities should be declared ille-
gal.2 59 In other cases, this rationale has been used either alone or in
conjunction with the "extent of sovereign activity" rationale in deter-
mining whether to apply the act of state doctrine."'0
The problem with this criterion, however, is that virtually every
court decision involving an international transaction has the potential of
interfering with the foreign policy interests of the United States. When
a foreign government is directly involved as a party and a suit is de-
cided against it, there is obviously the potential for embarrassment to
the executive branch. On the other hand, if the court's judgment is in
favor of the foreign sovereign, the result may be contrary to the goals of
the Executive. Indeed, United States foreign policy may be affected
even when the foreign sovereign is involved only indirectly in the trans-
action: our foreign policy is wide-ranging and involves not only na-
tional defense but also international commerce. 6 '
Similar problems arise when courts try to determine the applica-
tion of the act of state doctrine on the basis of another factor: the pur-
pose of the foreign sovereign's activity. Clayco and OPEC, for example,
state that if the sovereign's activity can be considered to have a public
purpose, courts should apply the act of state doctrine to avoid judging
that activity. 2 2 Contracts for the sale of commercial goods ranging from
oil and gas2"' to rhesus monkeys 26' have been characterized as public
acts, leading to the application of the act of state doctrine; in the courts'
view, these commercial transactions involve a sovereign's purpose to
preserve its scarce natural resources. This rationale, however, like the
one focusing on interference with foreign policy, covers far too many
situations: virtually every activity of a foreign sovereign has a public
purpose. Thus, seemingly commercial activities, such as those men-
tioned above, can be characterized as noncommercial and public by
2-58 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
259 See id. at 1359-60.
260 See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n,
549 F.2d 597, 605-06 (9th Cir. 1976).
21 Various federal laws, regulations, and controls deal with international com-
merce. To enforce these laws, the United States not only has the Department of Com-
merce, but also the United States Trade Representative, a member of the Cabinet spe-
cifically charged with directing foreign policy on international trade. See generally J.
JACKSON, INTERNATIONAL ECONoMIc RELATIONS, CASES AND MATERIALS 75-279,
433-941 (1977); A. LOWENFELD, PUBLIC CONTROLS ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE
(1979); A. LOWENFELD, TRADE CONTROLS FOR POLITICAL ENDS (1977).
282 See Clayco, 712 F.2d at 406; OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1360.
262 See id. at 405; OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1355; Hunt, 550 F.2d at 70-72.
264 See MOL, Inc. v. Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, 572 F. Supp. 79, 81 (D.
Or. 1983), affd, 736 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 513 (1984).
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looking to the activity's underlying purpose. It is noteworthy that courts
struggled for over forty years with this "underlying purpose of the com-
mercial activity" analysis in the sovereign immunity arena until Con-
gress, seeing the futility of the struggle, ended it in 1976 with the pas-
sage of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA).265
2. Disagreement About Exceptions to the Doctrine
The courts' inability to formulate a coherent standard for deter-
mining which governmental activities are considered acts of state has
led some courts to resort to a mechanical approach to the act of state
doctrine. This approach is exemplified by the Hunt decision of the Sec-
ond Circuit,266 to some extent by the OPEC and Clayco decisions of the
Ninth Circuit,267 and by most of the various district court decisions.
68
Under this approach courts cease to determine on a case-by-case basis
what activities rise to the level of an act of state. Instead, any foreign
governmental involvement in an international transaction will automat-
ically trigger application of the doctrine, unless the case falls within
some recognized exception.269 The problem with this approach, how-
ever, is that the courts, including the Supreme Court, have not agreed
on which exceptions to the doctrine should be recognized.
a. The Bernstein Exception
The most widely debated, and perhaps the oldest, exception to the
act of state doctrine is the Bernstein exception. Taking its name from a
famous 1954 Second Circuit case, Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandische-
Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij,2 0 the exception precludes
265 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(0, 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1982). For a
description of the FSIA, see supra text accompanying notes 312-18.
26 See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
267 See supra notes 147-93 and accompanying text.
268 See, e.g., MOL, Inc. v. Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, 572 F. Supp. 79, 83
(D. Or. 1983), affd, 736 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 513 (1984);
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 113-14 (C.D.
Cal. 1971), affd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950
(1972).
269 Note, however, Justice Marshall's statement in his dissent in Dunhill that
"[t]he carving out of broad exceptions to the [act of state] doctrine is fundamentally at
odds with the careful case-by-case approach adopted in Sabbatino." Dunhill, 425 U.S.
at 728 (Marshall, J., dissenting); accord Sage Int'l Ltd. v. Cadillac Gage Co., 534 F.
Supp. 896, 905 (E.D. Mich. 1981) (suggesting the adoption of a "flexible case-by-case
approach").
270 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). Bernstein, a German Jew, brought suit in the
United States after World War II to recover properties expropriated by the Nazis dur-
ing the war. In the first case brought by plaintiff, Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres
Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947), the Sec-
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application of the act of state doctrine if the State Department issues a
letter informing the court that the executive branch deems application
of the doctrine unnecessary.
The Bernstein exception has never been accepted by a majority of
the Supreme Court.271 Nevertheless, lower courts have tended to follow
the Executive's act of state recommendations automatically; 272 indeed,
many courts mechanically apply the doctrine unless the Executive is-
sues a "Bernstein letter.'2 73 The State Department, however, has been
miserly about issuing these letters.2 74 Moreover, in reaction to the
ond Circuit refused to hear the claim because of the act of state doctrine. See id. at 251-
52. Bernstein then filed a second complaint, against a different entity but based on the
same acts of expropriation. In response, the Second Circuit ordered him to refrain from
alleging matters that would require the court to judge the validity of acts by the official
Nazi German government during World War II. Bernstein v. N.V. Nederlandsche-
Amerikaansche Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 173 F.2d 71, 75-76 (2d Cir. 1949),
amended, 210 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1954). Thereafter, Bernstein was able to obtain a
letter from the State Department declaring that it was the Executive's policy to relieve
American courts from the restraints of the act of state doctrine in cases involving Nazi
expropriations.
Upon receipt of this communication, the Second Circuit amended its initial order
and allowed Bernstein to proceed with his action. See 210 F.2d at 375-76. Hence, the
term "Bernstein letter" is now used to refer to a communication from the State Depart-
ment informing a court that it has no objection to a decision on the merits.
271 The Supreme Court in Sabbatino expressly avoided ruling on the validity of
the Bernstein exception. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 420. In Citibank, the Bernstein
exception garnered only three votes, see 406 U.S. at 776-77; the other Justices of the
majority preferred to decide the case on other grounds, see id. at 773-76 (Powell, J.,
concurring in the judgment); id. at 770-73 (Douglas, J., concurring in the result). Of
particular interest is Justice Brennan's dissent in Citibank, in which he strongly re-
buked the plurality Justices for accepting the Bernstein exception. See 406 U.S. at 790-
93. In Dunhill, the Court chose to ignore the advice of the Executive by failing to
adopt the commercial activity exception. For criticism of the Bernstein exception, see
infra notes 305-09 and accompanying text.
2172 See, e.g., Bernstein, 210 F.2d at 375-76; Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabba-
tino, 307 F.2d 845, 857-58 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). Compare
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 884-85 (2d Cir.
1981) (Bernstein letter obtained, act of state defense not recognized) with Banco Na-
cional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank, 658 F.2d 903, 911 (2d Cir. 1981) and First Nat'l
Bank of Boston (Int'l) v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 658 F.2d 895, 902 (2d Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 495 U.S. 1091 (1982) (Bernstein letter not obtained, act of state defense
recognized).
2'7 See, e.g., Siderman v. Republic of Argentina, No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx)
(C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984), dismissed, No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx) (C.D. Cal.
Mar. 7, 1985), discussed in Note, Human Rights: Jurisdiction over Foreign States
Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 26 HARV. INT'L L.J. 594 (1985); Ethiopian Spice
Extraction Share Co. v. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co., 543 F. Supp. 1224, 1229
(W.D. Mich. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional
Military Gov't of Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984). For a further dis-
cussion of the Siderman litigation, see Bazyler, Litigating the International Law of
Human Rights in United States Courts: Siderman v. Republic of Argentina, INT'L
PRAC. NOTEBOOK, July 1985, at 1.
2174 Since 1954, when the original Bernstein letter was issued, the State Depart-
ment has received approximately two to three requests a year for such letters. Accord-
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lower courts' tendency to treat the absence of a Bernstein letter as a
mandate to apply the act of state doctrine, the State Department an-
nounced in the 1982 Robinson letter27 5 that, in cases in which there is
an applicable legal standard, courts should not construe the nonissuance
of a Bernstein letter as a signal that the Executive wants the act of state
doctrine to be applied.270 The clear implication of this statement is that
in the future the State Department will be even more reluctant to issue
Bernstein letters. Thus, the courts-especially the lower federal
courts-can no longer rely on the issuance or nonissuance of a Bern-
stein letter as a major factor in deciding whether to apply the act of
state doctrine. For all practical purposes, the Robinson letter may have
been the death-knell of the Bernstein exception. 7
b. The Commercial Activity Exception
Another often-applied limitation on the act of state doctrine is the
commercial activity exception.278 If a court characterizes the activity at
issue as commercial, then the exception will foreclose application of the
doctrine even if the activity is directly conducted by the sovereign.27 9
The Supreme Court in Dunhill, however, could not agree on whether
to recognize this exception.28 The circuits are likewise divided on the
ing to an official of the State Department, they have been issued in only seven in-
stances. Telephone conversation with John Schwartz, Office of Legal Adviser, U.S.
Dept. of State (Mar. 20, 1985).
2175 See supra notes 242-47 and accompanying text.
278 The State Department expressed its position in the following terms:
As a general rule, . . . where there is a controlling legal standard for
compensation we would not plan to inform the courts of the absence of
foreign policy objections to adjudication of expropriation claims. There-
fore, we would anticipate that silence on the part of the Executive in such
cases would not be relied upon as a basis for judicial abstention under the
Act of State Doctrine.
Robinson letter, supra note 243, at 208.
277 Of course, the Executive may continue to influence the judiciary through the
filing of amicus briefs. For example, in Allied Bank v. Banco Credito Agricola de
Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985), the State Department filed an amicus brief
urging the Second Circuit to decide the case on the merits. The Second Circuit did so,
reversing both the district court and its own earlier decision. For a discussion of this
case, see infra note 300.
278 See, e.g., Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 695-706; OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1360; Hunt, 550
F.2d at 73. For a history and analysis of the commercial activity exception, see Zaitzeff
& Kunz, The Act of State Doctrine and the Allied Bank Case, 40 Bus. LAw. 449,
464-69 (1985).
279 See authorities cited supra note 278.
280 Only Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined the part
of Justice White's opinion in Dunhill that recognized the commercial activity excep-
tion. See Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 684.
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issue,"'1 at least one of them internally. 2
c. The Treaty Exception
The treaty exception, which derives from Justice Harlan's caveat
to the holding in Sabbatino, provides that the act of state doctrine
should not be applied if the issue is governed by a "treaty or other
unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles."2 83 In
such circumstances the "treaty or other unambiguous agreement"
should control, despite any potential repercussions to United States for-
eign policy interests.
Until recently, the courts showed little enthusiasm for this excep-
tion. In Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahirya,2 4 for example, a district court in the District of Columbia
refused to enforce an arbitration award that the plaintiff obtained
against Libya through a previously agreed-upon arbitration proceeding.
The clear implication of Libyan American Oil was that a sovereign
may violate an unambiguous treaty or agreement applicable to a com-
mercial transaction without its actions being questioned by the Ameri-
can courts. 85
Similarly, in Ethiopian Spice Extraction Share Co. v. Kalamazoo
Spice Extraction Co.,2"' a district court in Michigan refused to allow
an American company to recover damages for the uncompensated ex-
propriation of its holdings in Ethiopia, despite the existence of a treaty
between Ethiopia and the United States that prohibited the taking of
property without a "'prompt payment of just and effective compensa-
tion.' "1287 The court found that the terms of the treaty were "inherently
general, doubtful, and susceptible of multiple interpretation," and re-
fused to invoke the treaty exception.' 8
281 Compare Hunt, 550 F.2d at 73 (Second Circuit's recognition, in dicta, of the
exception) with OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1360 (Ninth Circuit's rejection of the exception).
282 See supra note 174; see also Braka v. Bancomer, S.N.C., 762 F.2d 222, 225
(2d Cir. 1985) (emphasizing that the statements in Hunt were dicta and leaving open
"for another day" the existence of a commercial activity exception in the Second
Circuit).
283 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
284 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980), vacated mem., 684 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
285 See id. at 1178-79.
286 543 F. Supp. 1224 (W.D. Mich. 1982), rev'd sub nom. Kalamazoo Spice Ex-
traction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't of Socialist Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir.
1984).
287 Id. at 1230 (quoting Treaty of Amity and Economic Relations, Sept. 7, 1951,
United States-Ethiopia, art. VIII, § 2, 4 U.S.T. 2134, T.I.A.S. No. 2864).
288 Id.
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The Sixth Circuit, however, reversed the district court.28 9 Citing
Justice Harlan's caveat in Sabbatino, the court held that the American-
Ethiopian treaty precluded application of the act of state doctrine to the
Ethiopian government's expropriation.290
In resurrecting the treaty exception,291 the Sixth Circuit was prob-
ably influenced by strong encouragement it received from the Executive
and the private bar. The State Department issued the Robinson letter;
the State, Justice, and Treasury Departments filed a joint amicus brief;
and the American Bar Association filed a brief as well.292 In the face of
such an onslaught of arguments, all urging recognition of the treaty
exception, it is no wonder that the Sixth Circuit reversed the district
court and recognized the exception.
d. The Fraud Exception
The fraud exception is applied to cases in which acts of a foreign
government were induced by fraud or corruption. 93 Lately, however,
the exception has not been well received by the courts. The Ninth Cir-
cuit in Clayco expressly rejected the exception in the context of a pri-
vate suit,294 and both the Sixth Circuit, in Compania de Gas de Nuevo
Laredo, S.A. v. Entex, Inc.,295 and the Second Circuit, in Hunt,29 6
specifically declined to address the merits of the exception.
e. The United States Property Situs Exception
A more recent development in the act of state doctrine is the
United ,States property situs exception.2 97 This exception-which has
its origins in Judge Friendly's opinion in a 1965 case, Republic of Iraq
v. First National City Bank298-applies to international disputes in-
volving expropriated property located in the United States. American
29 Kalamazoo Spice Extraction Co. v. Provisional Military Gov't of Socialist
Ethiopia, 729 F.2d 422 (6th Cir. 1984).
290 See id. at 427-28.
291 The court, in an appendix to the opinion, listed other treaties which likewise
would support a treaty exception to the act of state doctrine. See id. at 428-30.
292 See id. at 422, 425.
293 See Sage Int'l Ltd. v. Cadillac Sage Co., 534 F. Supp. 896, 909-10 (E.D.
Mich. 1981); Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & Western Indus., 473 F. Supp.
680, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
29 See Clayco, 712 F.2d at 409.
295 686 F.2d 322, 326 (5th Cir. 1982).
298 See 550 F.2d at 79.
297 For discussions of the history of the exception, see Zaitzeff & Kunz, supra
note 278, at 451-58; Note, The Resolution of Act of State Disputes Involving Indefi-
nitely Situated Property, 25 VA. J. INT'L L. 901, 907-26 (1985).
298 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966).
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courts invoking this exception will apply the act of state doctrine to
disputes involving such property only if the foreign government's act of
expropriation is consistent with American policy and law.""' Since for-
eign acts of expropriation inevitably conflict with the fifth amendment's
prohibition against uncompensated governmental takings, this exception
invariably precludes application of the act of state doctrine when the
expropriated property or its proceeds are located in the United States.
This exception has not often been invoked, since property expro-
priated by a foreign government rarely is found in the United States.
On a theoretical level, however, the exception undercuts one of the most
frequently cited rationales for the application of the act of state doc-
trine, namely, that the doctrine should be invoked to prevent embar-
rassment to the Executive in its conduct of foreign policy. The invoca-
tion of the property situs exception does not depend on whether
adjudication of the claim could vex relations with foreign nations. Since
the same potential for executive embarrassment exists when an Ameri-
can court adjudicates rights to expropriated property located in the
United States as when it decides rights to expropriated property located
in a foreign country, no reason exists why potential for executive em-
barrassment should preclude adjudication of the latter but not the for-
mer claim. The property situs exception therefore exposes the weakness
of the "embarrassment to our foreign policy" rationale for the act of
state doctrine. If foreign expropriation claims can be adjudicated in
American courts when the property is located in the United States,
without concern for foreign policy implications, then all expropriation
claims should be so adjudicated.300
f. The Human Rights Exception
A final, as yet unapplied, exception to the act of state doctrine is
299 See id. at 51. This idea has been codified in the FSIA as a recognized excep-
tion to sovereign immunity. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1982).
300 The inconsistent application of this exception, as well as the other exceptions
to the act of state doctrine, was recently illustrated in Allied Bank v. Banco Credito
Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985). In Allied Bank, a consortium of
American banks sued three Costa Rican banks for failure to pay amounts due on prom-
issory notes in the United States. It seemed clear that the "United States property
situs" exception should apply, since the situs of the debt was in the United States. See
Zaitzeff & Kunz, supra note 278, at 473-83. Moreover, a district court in a nearly
identical case, Libra Bank v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, 570 F. Supp. 870
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), had invoked the exception. See id. at 881-83. However, in Allied
Bank both the district court and the Second Circuit refused to apply the exception until
the Executive filed an amicus brief suggesting that the exception be applied. See 757
F.2d at 519. Allied Bank, therefore, illustrates that the property situs exception may
depend on the position taken by the Executive. The same is true of the other exceptions
discussed above.
19861
374 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
the human rights exception. The sixth tentative draft of the Restate-
ment of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised) explains
the exception as follows:
A claim arising out of an alleged violation of fundamental
human rights-for instance, a claim on behalf of a victim of
torture or genocide-would (if otherwise sustainable) proba-
bly not be defeated by the act of state defense, since the ac-
cepted international law of human rights is both well estab-
lished and contemplates external scrutiny of such acts.301
To date, no court has explicitly recognized this exception,3"2 and
its tentative inclusion in the revised Restatement probably is due more
to the personal predilections of the Chief Reporter, Professor Louis
Henkin, than to its general acceptance in the law.303
The foregoing review of exceptions to the act of state doctrine
shows widespread disagreement not only about the scope but even
101 RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 469, at 361 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985). The American Law Institute (ALI)
adopted the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States in
1962 and promulgated it with revisions in 1965. In the late 1970's, the ALI began a
further revision of the Restatement, to be titled, in its final form, Restatement (Re-
vised). By the time of the ALI's annual meeting in May 1985, six tentative drafts had
been issued. The last draft, Tentative Draft No. 6, contains new sections 469 and 470,
dealing with the act of state doctrine; these supersede the act of state provisions in
sections 428 and 429 of Tentative Draft No. 4, issued in April 1983. Final action on
the Restatement (Revised) has been postponed until May 1986. See Hoyt, Chairman's
Column, INT'L L. NEWS, Summer 1985, at 1, 7.
The revision maintains an active act of state doctrine, such as that described in
Sabbatino and OPEC. This aspect of the revision has been sharply criticized. See
Halberstam, Sabbatino Resurrected: The Act of State Doctrine in the Revised Restate-
ment of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 79 Am. J. INT'L L. 68 (1985); Restatement of
Foreign Relations Law: Council Meets with ALI Reporters, INT'L L. NEWS, Winter
1984, at 1, 9.
302 Two cases have implicitly recognized the human rights exception. In Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir. 1980), the Second Circuit, in dictum, ex-
pressed its doubt that torture perpetrated by a state official, in violation of the law of
the foreign state and unauthorized by its government, could properly be characterized
as an act of state. The RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 301, § 469 note 3, cites
Filartiga in support of a human rights exception. In Siderman v. Republic of Argen-
tina, No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1984), dismissed, No. CV
82-1772-RMT (MCx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 1985), the district court dismissed on act of
state grounds a claim based on foreign expropriation of property but allowed the plain-
tiffs to proceed with claims based on torture. The court thus impliedly recognized that
torture claims cannot be defeated by the act of state doctrine, although it thereafter
dismissed the claims on sovereign immunity grounds. See Siderman v. Republic of Ar-
gentina, No. CV 82-1772-RMT (MCx) (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 1985), discussed in Note,
supra note 273.
3oS A representative expression of Professor Henkin's views may be found in Hen-
kin, Human Rights and "Domestic Jurisdiction," in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD 21 (T. Buergenthal ed. 1977).
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about the recognition of each exception. This confusion is understanda-
ble. If courts cannot agree on the proper scope of a doctrine, it is not
surprising that they cannot agree on the exceptions to it.
One result of this confusion is added uncertainty for parties con-
sidering international transactions. Being unable to predict whether a
dispute arising from such transactions will be adjudicable in United
States courts, they may be reluctant to take on this additional risk and
discouraged from entering international commerce.
B. Violating the Separation of Powers Doctrine
Another major failing of the act of state doctrine is that its appli-
cation often violates the constitutionally required separation of powers
between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the govern-
ment. The separation of powers doctrine contemplates that courts will
decide cases independently and without direction or influence from the
executive or legislative branches. The bulwark of our democracy is an
independent judiciary.
304
The act of state doctrine, as applied by American courts, violates
this separation of powers and interferes with judicial independence. As
part I of this Article has shown, courts are unduly sensitive to the Ex-
ecutive's views on whether the act of state doctrine should be applied in
particular cases. On occasion, they have even requested instruction
from the Executive on whether to apply the doctrine.305 In terms of the
Executive's interests, this may make some sense. As Justice Rehnquist
pointed out in his plurality opinion in Citibank, a major reason for
applying the act of state doctrine is to avoid interference with the Exec-
utive's conduct of foreign policy.306 If the Executive informs the court
that the case before it does not interfere with United States foreign
policy, then this rationale, at least, would not justify application of the
doctrine. 307 Such dependence on a pronouncement from the Executive,
however, allows the Executive in effect to replace the court as the deci-
sionmaker in the case. This, of course, diminishes the independence of
the judiciary and tarnishes its image.308 It is an embarrassment that
American federal courts, so independent in other areas, are so sub-
servient to the Executive where the act of state doctrine is concerned.309
1o See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
305 See supra note 274.
30I See Citibank, 406 U.S. at 765-67.
307 See id. at 768-69.
308 See id. at 790 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Blind adherence to the Executive's
requests concerning application of the act of state doctrine "politicizes the judiciary.").
309 The Second Circuit recently furnished some dramatic examples of embarrass-
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Faced with similar deference in the sovereign immunity area,
Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to prevent the
Executive from dictating results in cases in which sovereign immunity
is raised as a defense. Unfortunately, the independence restored by the
FSIA is lost when the judiciary bows to the executive will on act of
state grounds.
C. Impairing the Effectiveness of United States Laws
The act of state doctrine has undermined laws of major impor-
tance in the international arena: the Federal Sovereign Immunities
Acts1° and federal antitrust law. In addition, two other areas of law
affecting international commerce-federal securities law and the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977 31 -might be weakened by further
developments in the doctrine. Each of these laws will be discussed
separately.
1. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
In 1976, Congress codified the restrictive theory of foreign sover-
eign immunity by passing the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The
FSIA governs federal and state subject-matter jurisdiction in actions
against foreign sovereigns stemming from their commercial or private
law activities.$12 The FSIA drafters intended that courts would look to
the FSIA to decide whether a foreign sovereign could be sued.3"' De-
spite this intention, courts now resort to the act of state doctrine to
avoid adjudication even when the FSIA mandates it.3
1 4
ing judicial deference. In 1981, a Second Circuit panel had before it two similar cases.
Both involved counterclaims by American banks against Cuba that were based on the
nationalization of the banks' Cuban assets. The court allowed the first bank's claim to
proceed because it had obtained a Bernstein letter from the State Department. See
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875, 884 (2d Cir. 1981).
Because the second bank had failed to obtain such a letter, however, the court re-
manded the case to the district court for "findings as to the views of the Executive
Branch." Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Chemical Bank, 658 F.2d 903, 911-12 (2d Cir.
1981). The court made it clear that without a "green light" from the Executive, in the
form of a Bernstein letter, it would refrain from adjudicating foreign expropriation
claims, even if the party was not making an independent claim but merely asking for a
setoff against a claim by the expropriating government. Id. at 911.
For another such example, see supra note 300 (discussing Allied Bank v. Banco
Credito Agricola de Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir. 1985)).
10 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(0, 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1982).
.11 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)-(h), 78dd-1 to -2, 78ff(a), (c) (1982).
312 The best discussion on sovereign immunity and the FSIA is Kane, Suing For-
eign Sovereigns: A Procedural Compass, 34 STAN. L. REv. 385 (1982).
3's See FSIA House REPORT, supra note 155, at 6606.
314 See supra notes 158-66 and accompanying text. Even prior to passage of the
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The use of the act of state doctrine when a foreign sovereign is one
of the litigants negates a number of the FSIA's important policies. The
Act mandates examination of the nature of a commercial activity rather
than its purposes. 15 If the activity is commercial in nature, then the
case must be adjudicated. Using the act of state doctrine as a rationale,
however, courts have circumvented this directive and have continued to
examine the purpose of the activity. 16 A public purpose, which can be
found in almost every case involving a foreign sovereign,3 17 precludes
adjudication of the suit under the act of state doctrine. The public pur-
pose analysis, apparently abolished by the FSIA, has thus been
resurrected.
Similarly, Congress sought to abolish the courts' practice of look-
ing to the Executive to determine whether a foreign sovereign should be
immune from suit. The House Report accompanying the FSIA noted
that
the foreign state may attempt to bring diplomatic influences
to bear upon the State Department's determination. A prin-
cipal purpose of this bill is to transfer the determination of
sovereign immunity from the executive branch to the judicial
branch, thereby reducing the foreign policy implications of
immunity determinations and assuring litigants that these
often crucial decisions are made on purely legal grounds and
under procedures that insure due process.31
The continuing deference that courts give to the Executive in determin-
ing whether to apply the act of state doctrine clearly undermines these
policies.
FSIA, Justice White, in Part III of his opinion in Dunhill, warned against the use of
the act of state doctrine as a replacement for the doctrine of sovereign immunity: "[W]e
hold that the mere assertion of sovereignty as a defense to a claim . . . is no more
effective if given the label 'Act of State' than if it is given the label 'sovereign immu-
nity.'" 425 U.S. at 705 (footnote omitted).
Unfortunately, only three other justices joined in Part III of Justice White's Dun-
hill opinion. As a result, lower courts increasingly have ignored that part of Dunhill
and found the act of state doctrine applicable when sovereign immunity was lacking.
See cases cited supra note 166.
315 See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1982); FSIA HOUSE REPORT, supra note 155, at
6614-15.
316 See, e.g., Clayco, 712 F.2d at 406; OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1360; MOL, Inc. v.
Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, 572 F. Supp. 79, 85 (D. Or. 1983), affid, 736 F.2d
1326 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 513 (1984).
317 See supra text accompanying notes 262-65.
31I FSIA HOUSE REPORT, supra note 155, at 6605-06.
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2. The Antitrust Laws
The antitrust laws are among the most important and effective
provisions regulating economic activity in the United States. The pur-
pose of these laws is to preserve "free and unfettered competition as the
rule of trade."31 9 Moreover, the antitrust laws have an extraterritorial
effect. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, for example, contains no territo-
rial limitation: "Every contract, combination . . .or conspiracy, in re-
straint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, is declared to be illegal."' 20 For this reason, the Sherman Act,
and with it the other antitrust laws,3 21 may be applied to conduct be-
yond United States borders so long as the conduct has a "direct and
substantial effect"322 on United States commerce.
Application of the antitrust laws to activities beyond our borders
brings numerous benefits. First, it prevents circumvention of the anti-
trust laws by multinational corporations that might otherwise attempt
to consummate anticompetitive transactions beyond the territorial bor-
ders of the United States. Second, it helps to protect the export oppor-
tunities of American firms, by making foreign firms subject to the same
antitrust rules. Finally, by improving competition among competing
importers, extraterritorial antitrust jurisdiction may spur complacent
domestic industries to more competitive behavior, with resulting bene-
fits to American consumers. 23
American antitrust policy depends for enforcement not only on ac-
tions brought by the Executive, through the Federal Trade Commission
or the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, but also on
319 Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958); see also, e.g., R.
POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 3 (1976) ("The basic concern
of the antitrust laws is with monopoly .. .
$20 15 U.S.C § 1 (1982).
12' Besides the Sherman Act, the other important antitrust laws are the Clayton
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-22, 27 (1982), the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C
§§ 41-51 (1982), and, to a lesser extent, the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-
13b, 21a (1982). See R. POSNER, supra note 319, at 23-31, 179-80.
12 Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n, 549 F.2d
597, 610 (9th Cir. 1976). For informative discussions of the extraterritorial application
of the antitrust laws, see In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1253-56 (7th
Cir. 1980); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d
Cir. 1979); see also W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS
29-86 (2d ed. 1973); Dunfee & Friedman, The Extra-Territorial Application of
United States Antitrust Laws: A Proposal for an Interim Solution, 45 OHIO ST. L.J.
883 (1984); Note, Extraterritorial Application of Federal Antitrust Laws: Delimiting
the Reach of Substantive Law Under the Sherman Act, 20 VAND. L. REV. 1030
(1967); Comment, Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws: A Conflict of
Laws Approach, 70 YALE L.J. 259 (1960).
323 See D. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS IN A NUTSHELL
125 (2d ed. 1984).
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private suits brought by aggrieved parties.3 24 In fact, private enforce-
ment is encouraged by the awarding of treble damages.325 By preclud-
ing adjudication of suits brought by private parties for antitrust viola-
tions occurring outside the United States, the act of state doctrine
effectively destroys this private enforcement mechanism. The Second
Circuit's Hunt decision aptly illustrates how a clear violation of the
antitrust laws can remain unpunished when a foreign government lurks
in the background of a private lawsuit.326
3. The Securities Laws
The various securities laws are another important means of regu-
lating economic activity in the United States. Passed in the aftermath of
the Great Depression, these laws are designed to ensure that accurate
information is provided to purchasers of securities. 27 The securities
laws, like the antitrust laws, have been applied to transactions outside
of the United States that have a direct and substantial effect on United
States commerce.3 28
The extraterritorial application of the securities laws clearly pro-
motes fairness in securities transactions affecting American firms and
individuals. Corporations and brokers cannot avoid the requirements of
fair dealing and full disclosure simply by shifting securities transactions
outside the borders of the United States.
The securities laws may be circumvented, however, if the transac-
tion in question can be characterized as involving an act of state. If the
reasoning behind the act of state decisions involving antitrust law is
extended to the securities area, a foreign sovereign, or even a private
litigant in conjunction with a foreign sovereign, could probably violate
the securities laws with impunity. The doctrine, therefore, has the po-
S24 See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982); R. POSNER, supra note 319, at 31-35; L. SUL-
LIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 751-96 (1977).
32 See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1982); R. POSNER, supra note 319, at 31; L. SuLLI-
VAN, supra note 324, at 769.
321 See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
327 Although securities transactions are subject to both federal and state laws, the
federal regulatory scheme is more important. Federal securities law consists primarily
of six statutes enacted between 1933 and 1940, and one enacted in 1970. Of the six, the
two most important are the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1982),
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982). See generally
T. HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION (1985).
328 See, e.g., Continental Grain v. Pacific Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 420-21
(8th Cir. 1979); Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 999 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 1018 (1975); Travis v. Anthes Imperial Ltd., 473 F.2d 515 (8th Cir.
1973); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir.
1972).
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tential to emasculate the securities laws as they affect extraterritorial
transactions.
3 29
4. The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
Another important federal law regulating the practice of American
business in the international marketplace is the Foreign Corrupt Prac-
tices Act of 1977 (FCPA). 30 The FCPA prohibits the payment of
bribes by American businesses to officials of foreign governments3 31 on
the grounds that such activities hurt rather than help our foreign com-
merce.332 The executive branch, through the Justice Department, en-
forces the Act by bringing suit against the American offender. 3 The
FCPA has also been interpreted to include a private enforcement mech-
anism that permits private parties to file suit for damages.33
Private litigants may find, however, that their suits are barred by
the act of state doctrine. Since the violation is, by definition, a payment
to a foreign official, inherent in every private suit under the FCPA is
the involvement of a foreign government. Adjudicating FCPA enforce-
32' Beyond the antitrust and securities laws, the act of state doctrine has the po-
tential of severely limiting any United States law that contains an extraterritorial com-
ponent. For instance, in Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956), the Second Circuit restricted enforcement of
the United States trademark laws because of the act of state doctrine. The court held
that the defendants' possession of a Canadian trademark registration prevented it from
examining an alleged infringement of the plaintiff's similar United States trademark.
The court limited application of the trademark laws even though it acknowledged that
(1) such laws reach conduct abroad that has a substantial effect in the United States
and (2) the defendants' conduct had such an effect. See id. at 642. But see American
Rice, Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n, 701 F.2d 408, 416 (5th Cir. 1983)
(asserting that the act of state doctrine does not bar extraterritorial copyright infringe-
ment actions).
$30 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)-(h), 78dd-1 to -2, 78ff(a), (c) (1982). For
more extensive discussions of the FCPA, see Baruch, The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act, 57 HARV. Bus. REV. 32 (1979); Surrey, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Let
the Punishment Fit the Crime, 20 HARV. INT'L L.J. 293 (1979); Note, The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: An Analysis of Its Impact and Future, 5 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 405 (1982); Comment, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 27
U. KAN. L. REV. 635 (1979).
331 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -2 (1982).
332 H.R. REP. No. 831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 12, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 4121.
333 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c) (1982).
I" See Notification of Enactment of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, [Ac-
counting Series Releases 1937-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
72,264, at 62,699-702 (Feb. 16, 1978); Letter from Frederick B. Wade, Special
Counsel of the SEC, to Raymond Garcia (May 16, 1978) (discussing the FCPA's con-
templation of a private right of action), reprinted in 1 FOREIGN CORRUPT PRAC. ACT
REP. (BUSINEss LAWS, INC.) 213; Siedel, Internal Accounting Controls Under the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: A Federal Law of Corporations?, 18 AM. Bus. L.J.
445, 471 (1981).
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ment actions will nearly always require an examination of the reasons
for the payment and the motivation of the foreign official in accepting
the payment. Courts might therefore invoke the act of state doctrine as
a convenient excuse to avoid deciding difficult FCPA cases."' 5
D. Impeding the Development of International Law
in the United States
In the view of many international legal scholars, the greatest dam-
age done by the act of state doctrine has been to inhibit the develop-
ment of international law in the United States.33 The most important
goal of international legal scholars and organizations has been to pro-
mote the rule of law in the international arena.1 7 A well-defined and
widely followed international legal order will lead, it is hoped, to the
peaceful resolution of disputes among nations.3 8 The United Na-
tions 3 9 and the International Court of Justices ° were created specifi-
cally for this purpose.
Not long after the creation of these international bodies, however,
it became clear, even to their most ardent supporters, that they were
not fulfilling these expectations. Neither the United Nations 4 nor the
s See, e.g., Clayco, 712 F.2d at 407 (discussing adjudication of a claim based on
bribery of foreign sovereign). Alternatively, a court might conclude that bribery in vio-
lation of the foreign state's own laws does not constitute an "act of state" and thus
refuse to invoke the doctrine. Cf. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 889 (2d Cir.
1980) (expressing doubt that torture perpetrated by a state official, in violation of the
law of the foreign state and unauthorized by its government, could properly be charac-
terized as an act of state).
338 See, e.g., Wallace, Abolishing or Changing the Act of State Doctrine by Legis-
lation: Comments, in AcT OF STATE AND EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH 25, 25 (J.
Lacey ed. 1983) ("If there were no Act of State doctrine, international law would come
in.").
337 See J. SWEENEY, C. OLIvER & N. LEEcH, supra note 61, at 1 (There is an
"urgent need for the growth of [international] order beyond the rules that have devel-
oped in the West."); Inside ABA: News Update, A.B.A. J., June 1984, at 141 (advanc-
ing the rule of law in the world is an ABA goal); see also U.N. CHARTER preamble
(announcing purpose "to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the
obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be
maintained").
M See U.N. CHARTER preamble.
33 See id. at preamble, art. I; 1 L. GROSS, The United Nations and the Role of
Law, in ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION 159, 163-71 (1984).
340 G.A. Res. 171 (II), U.N. Doc. A/459, at 1559 (1947); Dillard, The World
Court: Reflections of a Professor Turned Judge, 27 AM. U.L. REv. 205, 242-43
(1978).
341 See, e.g., J. HALDERMAN, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE RuLE OF LAW 1
(1966) ("Although the United Nations was intended to serve . . . as the framework of
[a system capable of maintaining peace], its potential in this respect is today virtually
written off."); E. LUARD, THE UNITED NATIONS: How IT WORKS AND WHAT IT
DOES 1-8 (1979) ("Has the U.N. failed?"); id. at 154-71 ("Can the System be Re-
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International Court of Justice342 has been used extensively to resolve
international disputes; consequently, these bodies have been unable to
create a widely followed international rule of law.
For this reason, international legal scholars have looked to various
domestic institutions as a means to promote international law. One
such institution, found in every nation, is the domestic court. Promoting
and developing the rule of law is the court's function, and it can per-
form this function not only with domestic law but also with interna-
tional law. In 1964, Professor Richard Falk, in his monumental trea-
tise, The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order,
presented the thesis that domestic courts, in dealing with cases that in-
volve the international arena, act as agents of the international legal
order. 4" According to Falk, and later to others, 44 the attitude that do-
mestic courts take with respect to international law will determine
whether international law develops or stagnates.3 4 5 Because the United
States is a superpower and the American judicial system is highly
respected in the rest of the world, the American courts' treatment of
international law takes on a special significance.
formed?"); J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, supra note 61, at 1299-1300
("What went wrong?").
34 See, e.g., J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, supra note 61, at 70 ("The
unwillingness of States to resolve their disputes by referring them to the court has
caused concern about its future."). See generally J. GAMBLE, JR. & D. FISCHER, THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: AN ANALYSIS OF A FAILURE 1-5, 11-27 (1976).
Some of the most recent efforts of the International Court of Justice have also met with
failure. In 1979, Iran refused to recognize the court's order to release the American
hostages held at the U.S. Embassy in Teheran. J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH,
supra note 61, at 70. In 1985, the United States refused to submit to the court's juris-
diction in order to prevent the court from adjudicating the legality of American inter-
vention in Nicaragua, United States: Statement on the U.S. Withdrawal from the Pro-
ceedings Initiated by Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice, 24 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 246-63 (1985); Kempster & Hager, U.S to Boycott World Court
Nicaragua Case, L.A. Times, Jan. 19, 1985, at 1, col. 3, and later withdrew its accept-
ance of compulsory jurisdiction from the court, see Effron, Critics Lambast Reagan
Pull-Back From World Court, L.A. Daily J., Oct. 11, 1985, at 1, col. 6.
"' See R. FALK, supra note 4. Professor Falk's other writings in this area include
R. FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 525 (1970); Falk, The
Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of International Legal Order, in
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 32, 69 (R. Falk & C. Black
eds. 1969).
I" See Friedmann, National Courts and the International Legal Order. Projec-
tions on the Implications of the Sabbatino Case, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 443 (1966);
Lillich, supra note 48, at 12-27, 37-50; Note, Limiting the Act of State Doctrine, supra
note 2, at 122-26; see also Citibank, 406 U.S. at 775 (Powell, J., concurring in the
judgment) (stating that hope for defining an international "act of state" doctrine will be
lost if the task is "relegated to political rather than judicial processes").
According to Professor Falk, "[diomestic courts provide an excellent arena
within which to exhibit either a scornful or a constructive attitude toward the relevance
of international law to international behavior." R. FALK, supra note 4, at 12.
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Unfortunately, by applying the act of state doctrine, American
courts have engaged in "judicial abdication"" 6 of their responsibility
for resolving international law issues.3 17 In contrast, the domestic courts
of other nations have long taken an active role in the use and develop-
ment of international law.348 The failure of American courts to do so
has caused irreparable harm to the reputation of international law and
to its continued development.
Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion in Citibank, made this
point succinctly:
[U]ntil international tribunals command a wider constitu-
ency, the courts of various countries afford the best means
for the development of a respected body of international law.
There is less hope for progress in this long-neglected area if
the resolution of all disputes involving an "act of state" is
relegated to political rather than judicial processes. 9
Continued resort by American courts to the act of state doctrine to
avoid deciding international law issues dims the hope of Justice Powell
and others that the American judiciary will help to develop a respected
311 In 1970, Professor Lillich characterized domestic courts in the United States as
being in "a period of 'judicial abdication' to the executive branch in cases involving
international law issues." Lillich, supra note 48, at 11. Lillich concluded that "domes-
tic courts have revealed substantial ingenuity in avoiding the necessity of deciding inter-
national law cases where the local sovereign's conduct has been called into question."
Id. at 48 (footnote omitted).
A decade later, in 1980, Senator Mathias also concluded that American courts, in
applying the act of state doctrine, are "shirking a responsibility taken on by other judi-
ciaries around the world [and] announc[ing] that they will take no part in the develop-
ment or application of international law." Mathias, supra note 2, at 414. See also Act
of State Hearings, supra note 10, at 2 (statement of Sen. Mathias) ("Hiding behind
the skirts of the act of state doctrine," courts have refused to apply international law to
Cuba's expropriations.).
"I The act of state doctrine "prevents the United States from applying interna-
tional law-and I do not accept the position of the Justice Department that we cannot
trust our judges to develop international law." Act of State Hearings, supra note 10, at
23 (statement of Prof. Don Wallace, Jr.). The American courts have avoided interna-
tional law issues despite the Supreme Court's famous statement in The Paquete Ha-
bana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), that "[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be
ascertained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determina-
tion." Id. at 700.
3,8 Justice White's dissenting opinion in Sabbatino-citing cases from England,
the Netherlands, Germany, Japan, Italy, and France-states that "the executive of no
other government seems to require such insulation from international law adjudications
in its courts; and no other judiciary is apparently so incompetent to ascertain and apply
international law." Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 440 (White, J., dissenting) (footnote omit-
ted). Justice Powell quoted this statement in his concurring opinion in Citibank. See
406 U.S. at 775 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
", Citibank, 406 U.S. at 775 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
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body of international law. 5'
III. ALTERNATIVES TO THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The previous sections of this Article have described a number of
problems with current applications of the act of state doctrine. The doc-
trine fosters arbitrary and unpredictable adjudication of international
disputes, undermines judicial independence, weakens the intended force
of several United States laws, and arrests the development of interna-
tional law by the American courts. The existence of such serious
problems suggests that the doctrine should be abolished.35
Abolishing the doctrine would not strip the courts of all opportu-
nity to forgo adjudication of cases involving international transactions;
clearly, judicial abstention is sometimes appropriate. The circumstances
in which restraint is proper, however, are poorly described by the term
"act of state doctrine." In fact, there is no single doctrine under this
heading, but rather a collection of several, often inconsistent, adjudica-
tive principles. These principles, if applied individually, would give a
narrower, more rational, and more consistent content to the concerns
350 International law is further undermined by judicial invocation of the Bernstein
exception. See supra text accompanying notes 270-77. As Professor Falk warns, tolera-
tion of executive intervention in international law cases "is itself a deprecation of the
commitment to international law. The prestige of international law in domestic courts
is undermined if its application depends upon a prior political authorization." R. FALK,
supra note 4, at 93.
351 There has been much debate about whether the act of state doctrine is recog-
nized by other nations. The debate is an important one. If other nations can survive
without an American-style act of state doctrine, then perhaps the United States can do
so as well.
Some have suggested that an American-style act of state doctrine exists in other
judicial systems. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 416 (noting that Great Britain recognized
the doctrine as early as 1674); id. at 421 n.21 (stating that similar doctrine exists in
both Great Britain and civil law countries). Others have argued that, while some na-
tions may recognize an act of state doctrine, none has given it such widespread applica-
tion as the United States. See Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 709-10 (State Department letter
discussing trend of foreign courts to review fbreign acts of state); Sabbatino, 376 U.S.
at 440 (White, J., dissenting) (Courts of six nations, including Great Britain, decide
cases that would be denied review on American-style act of state grounds.).
The latter view seems correct. As summarized by Senator Mathias, "[tihe United
States is alone among those nations with advanced legal systems in adhering to this
version of the act of state doctrine." Mathias, supra note 2, at 414. See also Act of
State Hearings, supra note 10, at 22 ("[A]Imost no other country has the doctrine.");
id. at 29 ("[T]he doctrine is largely unique to the United States.") (statement of Prof.
Don Wallace, Jr.). Some confusion may arise because foreign courts sometimes ascribe
to the act of state doctrine decisions that are actually based on the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. See Wallace, Abolishing or Changing the Act of State Doctrine by Legisla-
tion: Introductory Remarks, in ACT OF STATE AND EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH 3, 6
(J. Lacey ed. 1983). In general, nations have been able to function without an Ameri-
can-style act of state doctrine without suffering tragic foreign policy consequences.
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now animating the act of state doctrine.352
A. Sovereign Immunity
One of the most widely stated rationales for the act of state doc-
trine is that it prevents interference with the foreign policy of the
United States and, similarly, prevents embarrassment to foreign govern-
ments in our courts.3 53 These same policies, however, are served by the
universally accepted doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity. As previ-
ously discussed, the act of state doctrine was originally a mere extension
of that doctrine.'" With the passage of the FSIA, Congress mandated
that all issues pertaining to sovereign immunity, including considera-
tions of foreign policy and political embarrassment, be decided in accor-
dance with the terms of the Act. Since these same considerations are
given to justify the act of state doctrine, the doctrine logically should be
preempted by the FSIA.
The drafters of the FSIA seemed to recognize that the Act would
limit the need for the act of state doctrine. They expected that, with the
gradual weakening of the act of state doctrine through cases like Dun-
hill, the doctrine would be applicable only in very limited circum-
stances. 5 Of course, the drafters were wrong; despite the FSIA, courts
continue to use the doctrine in litigation involving foreign sovereigns.
B. Forum Non Conveniens
Forum non conveniens is a judicially created doctrine that courts
use to abstain from cases that rightfully should be- decided in another
forum. 55 Even though a case may be meritorious, a court may decline
to hear it on forum non conveniens grounds if substantially all of the
352 Professor Wallace agrees with this view. "What I have tried to say is that you
wouldn't open yourself up to a horrible situation by eliminating the Act of State doc-
trine. There would still be ways to prevent the most horrible situations, should they
arise." Wallace, supra note 336, at 25.
353 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 139-40, 170, 200 & 306.
35 See supra text accompanying notes 22-34.
355 See FSIA HOUSE REPORT, supra note 155, at 6606.
356 For a thorough discussion of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in interna-
tional litigation, see Note, The Convenient Forum Abroad Revisited: A Decade of De-
velopment of the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation in
the Federal Courts, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 755 (1977). For recent cases discussing the
doctrine at length, and affirming dismissals on international forum non conveniens
grounds, see Cheng v. Boeing Co., 708 F.2d 1406, 1409-10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1017 (1983); Islamic Republic of Iran v. Pahlavi, 62 N.Y.2d 474, 478-84, 467
N.E.2d 245, 247-51, 478 N.Y.S.2d 597, 599-602 (1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 783
(1985). Cheng and Pahlavi confirm the continued viability of the forum non conveniens
doctrine in the international arena.
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events involved in the suit took place in another jurisdiction, if the par-
ties are located in another jurisdiction, or if all the material evidence is
located in another jurisdiction.3 57 No strict guidelines are established
for the application of forum non conveniens. If the court believes that,
in the interest of justice, it would be unfair for the defendant to under-
take the burden of defense in the forum in which the case is filed, the
court may decline to hear the case.
58
The doctrine of forum non conveniens is particularly applicable in
cases involving international transactions.3 59 A trial in the United
States might require the defendant first to undertake discovery abroad
and then to bring evidence and witnesses to the United States. An addi-
tional burden, often faced by both the defendant and the court, is the
necessity of applying foreign law.36 0 The time and expense of under-
taking such additional tasks may convince the court that it should de-
cline to hear the case in favor of a more proper, foreign forum. 6x
Under this doctrine, the burden of proving forum non conveniens
rests on the defendant.3 62 Additionally, if the plaintiff shows that the
foreign forum is impractical for hearing the case, then the defendant's
forum non conveniens motion will fail. 63 These balancing considera-
tions, which make the forum non conveniens doctrine more flexible
than the act of state doctrine, give courts sufficient leeway to decide, on
principles of justice and practicality, whether to adjudicate disputes
arising from foreign transactions.
C. In Personam Jurisdiction
The question whether the Republic of France can be sued for a
particular act is very different from the question where France may be
sued. The answer to the first question depends on whether France en-
joys sovereign immunity; the answer to the second depends on whether
157 See Cheng v. Boeing Co., 708 F.2d 1406, 1409-10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1017 (1983).
188 See id. at 1409.
159 See Note, supra note 356, at 755-57.
360 For a discussion of the difficulties of applying foreign law in American courts,
see Merryman, Foreign Law as a Problem, 19 STAN. J. INT'L L. 151 (1983), and
Sprankling & Lanyi, Pleading and Proof of Foreign Law in American Courts, 19
STAN. J. INT'L L. 3 (1983).
361 See Cheng v. Boeing Co., 708 F.2d 1406, 1409-10 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1017 (1983).
36I See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3828 (1976).
363 See id.; see also, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860, 862
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (rejecting forum non conveniens argument because further resort to
Paraguayan courts to obtain relief for torture committed in Paraguay would be futile).
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France has engaged in conduct that warrants a summons before an
American court.36 4 Failure to distinguish between these two questions
may lead a court to invoke the act of state doctrine in cases in which it
lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant.
The requirement that personal jurisdiction over the defendant be
consistent with constitutional due process is set out by the Supreme
Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.365 International Shoe
requires that the defendant have sufficient contacts with the forum so
that assertion of personal jurisdiction would not offend notions of fair
play and substantial justice.366 Hanson v. Denkla67 interpreted the In-
ternational Shoe "minimum contacts" standard as requiring that the
defendant's activities suggest that it has purposely availed itself of the
privileges and benefits of the laws of the forum state. 8"
The minimum contacts requirement of International Shoe re-
mains an important tool for dismissing cases that should not have been
brought in United States courts. Unlike the the act of state doctrine,
with its vague "constitutional underpinnings," the International Shoe
requirement is grounded solidly on the due process clause of the Con-
stitution. Therefore, rather than jumping blindly onto the act of state
bandwagon, courts should first consider the minimum contacts require-
ment of International Shoe. Upon closer analysis, courts may find that
in many international transactions cases the defendant lacks the requi-
site minimum contacts with the forum. Of course, if the defendant,
whether a foreign sovereign or a private party, has sufficient contacts
with the United States to satisfy the due process requirements for per-
sonal jurisdiction, then this may help to convince the court that the case
should be adjudicated in the United States.
D. Choice of Law
As discussed in part I of this Article, the original purpose of the
act of state doctrine was to afford personal immunity to foreign officials
who acted consistently with the laws of their jurisdiction. This use of
the act of state doctrine is no more than an application of choice of law
rules.3
61
The typical case involving personal immunity involves acts of a
foreign official in the official's own country that form the basis for a
3" This example is taken from Kane, supra note 312, at 396.
se5 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
I'l See id. at 316.
367 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
368 Id. at 253.
869 See supra text accompanying notes 40-46.
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suit brought in the United States. Assuming that the minimum contacts
requirement of International Shoe has been met, the court in such a
situation would need to decide under the federal choice of law analysis
what law applies to the case. If all of the wrongful acts occurred in the
foreign jurisdiction, choice of law rules may require that the "law of
the case" be the law of the foreign jurisdiction."' 0
If the defendant is found not liable under the laws of the foreign
jurisdiction, the court would rule in favor of the defendant. If, on the
other hand, the defendant were found liable under the foreign law, then
the court would grant judgment for the plaintiff. The decision to apply
foreign law, as well as the ultimate disposition of the case, would be
reached without any reliance on the act of state doctrine. Choice of law
thus presents an additional method by which a case can be decided on
other than act of state grounds.
E. Foreign Sovereign Compulsion
An additional means for a court to avoid deciding a case without
resort to the act of state doctrine is through the doctrine of foreign sov-
ereign compulsion. This doctrine, limited to antitrust cases, "is based
on the theory that defendants engaged in illegal [antitrust] activity only
because a foreign sovereign compelled them to do so." ' While the doc-
trine has often been confused with the act of state doctrine,372 it has an
independent existence and may apply without regard to whether the act
of state doctrine is applicable.373 The doctrine of foreign sovereign com-
pulsion, which is based on principles of equity, relieves a party from
370 For a discussion of the treatment of foreign law under American choice of law
rules, see R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 6 (1977). See also E. ScoLES &
P. HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 403-14 (1984) (describing the procedures and standards
applicable to the proof of foreign law).
... Timberg, Sovereign Immunity and Act of State Defenses: Transnational Boy-
cotts and Economic Coercion, 55 TEX. L. REV. 1, 22 (1976). See generally Note, For-
eign Sovereign Compulsion in American Antitrust Law, 33 STAN. L. REV. 131 (1980)
(arguing that the act of state corollary provides an unfair windfall to antitrust defen-
dants at the expense of plaintiffs).
" See Griffin, Antitrust and Act of State, in ACT OF STATE AND EXTRATERRI-
TORIAL REACH, supra note 336, at 17; Mathias, supra note 2, at 390-91. Griffin cites
In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 617 F.2d 1248, 1254 n.21 (7th Cir. 1980), as an exam-
ple of a case that confused the two doctrines. See Griffin, supra, at 22.
373 See Griffin, supra note 372, at 22; Mathias, supra note 2, at 391-92. Senator
Mathias's bill to modify the act of state doctrine included language stating that "the act
of state doctrine is conceptually and legally separate and distinct from the defense of
'foreign sovereign compulsion,'" and that the bill would not influence the effectiveness
of the foreign sovereign compulsion defense. S. 1434, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2, 5
(1981), reprinted in Act of State Hearings, supra note 10, at 3, 3-5. This language
was no doubt appreciated by the antitrust bar, which strongly favors the foreign sover-
eign compulsion defense. See Griffin, supra note 372, at 21-22.
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choosing between two evils: acting anticompetitively, pursuant to a for-
eign sovereign's directive, and thus violating United States laws, or act-
ing competitively, against the foreign sovereign's directive, thereby risk-
ing the wrath of the sovereign. The doctrine allows the private party to
act anticompetitively without incurring liability under United States
law.
Unlike the act of state doctrine, the foreign sovereign compulsion
doctrine does not arise from fear that a decision on the merits would
interfere with international politics or foreign policymaking. Rather,
courts invented the doctrine to avoid the unfairness of forcing antitrust
defendants to choose between two evils.
Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc."7 4 is a
paradigmatic foreign sovereign compulsion case. In that case, two de-
fendant oil companies held concessions from the Venezuelan govern-
ment for the production of crude oil. The oil companies were instructed
by the Venezuelan government not to ship crude oil to Interamerican,
an American corporation principally owned by two Venezuelan. nation-
als who were considered personae non gratae in Venezuela. When the
oil companies complied, Interamerican sued, claiming an illegal boy-
cott. In granting summary judgment for the defendants, the district
court found that the boycott was compelled by the Venezuelan authori-
ties and that "such compulsion is a complete defense to an action under
the antitrust laws based on that boycott. 37 5
The defense of foreign sovereign compulsion, based strictly on
grounds of equity, provides a court with another means of deciding a
foreign antitrust case without resort to the act of state doctrine.
F. Political Question Doctrine
A final situation in which a court could legitimately dismiss an
international transaction case on other than act of state grounds arises
when a case presents issues that are best resolved through the political
rather than the judicial process. In such a situation, the political ques-
tion doctrine is applicable.
The Supreme Court gave the political question doctrine its modern
formulation in Baker v. Carr.
37 6
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a politi-
cal question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department;
""' 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970).
375 Id. at 1296.
376 369 U.S. 186 (1982).
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or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards
for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking inde-
pendent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due
coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifari-
ous pronouncements by various departments on one
question.
377
Cases touching on the foreign relations of the United States make up
the largest class of cases to which the political question doctrine has
been applied . 78 For this reason, the political question doctrine is par-
ticularly well suited for application in cases that would otherwise be
dismissed on act of state grounds.
The act of state doctrine, as defined by Sabbatino, incorporates the
three most important criteria of the political question doctrine: (1) con-
stitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate branch; (2) lack of
judicial standards for resolving the issue; and (3) potential for embar-
rassing the Executive.37 9 Justice Brennan, the author of Baker v. Carr,
even argued in his dissenting opinion in Citibank that the act of state
doctrine elaborated in Sabbatino is simply one application of the politi-
cal question doctrine.38 0 The Ninth Circuit in OPEC similarly stated
that the act of state doctrine is to be considered an "international" po-
litical question doctrine.""
If the act of state doctrine is indeed only an "international" politi-
cal question doctrine, it is superfluous. The act of state doctrine, how-
ever, is not only superfluous; it also creates widespread confusion, in-
hibits the application of United States laws and the development of
international law, and affords the courts an expedient excuse for avoid-
ing difficult legal analysis. If a true political question is presented to a
court, 8 ' the Baker v. Carr factors can be applied to dismiss the case on
37 Id. at 217. For a discussion of the political question doctrine and citations to
additional authorities, see L. TRIBE, supra note 11, § 3-16, at 71.
378 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 211-14; Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Repub-
lic, 726 F.2d 774, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1354 (1985).
71 See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (mem.) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1511 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (en banc), vacated mem., 105 S. Ct. 2353 (1985).
380 Citibank, 406 U.S. at 787-88 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
381 OPEC, 649 F.2d at 1358-59. A recent New York federal district court decision
recognized the parallel interests of the two doctrines, treating them together in one
discussion. Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 547-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
38' True political question cases are rare. See infra text accompanying notes 389-
92.
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political question grounds. If the political question doctrine is not ap-
plicable, the court should either hear the case or articulate a specific
reason, such as one of the reasons discussed above, for dismissing it.
Specificity of rationale will eliminate the vague act of state pronounce-
ments currently offered by courts to justify dismissals.
It may be asked, however, whether the proposed abolition of the
act of state doctrine would result merely in a substitution of the new
excuse of "political question" for the old excuse of "act of state,"
thereby continuing the same evils under a new rubric. Such a result is
highly unlikely. Unlike the amorphous and unrestrained act of state
doctrine, "[n]onjusticiability based upon 'political question' is at best a
limited doctrine."38 3 In Baker v. Carr the Supreme Court emphasized
that the doctrine does not render all "political cases" nonjusticiable.38'
The Court limited the use of the doctrine to cases that involve "primar-
ily a function of the separation of powers."""5 The opinion also noted
that the doctrine in no respect requires that all issues implicating for-
eign affairs be ruled political questions. 86
Subsequent Supreme Court 8 7 and lower court 88 decisions have
383 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Ed-
wards, J., concurring), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1354 (1985). Later in his opinion,
Judge Edwards explained that "the political question doctrine is a very limited basis
for nonjusticiability. It certainly does not provide the judiciary with a carte blanche
license to block the adjudication of difficult or controversial cases." Id. at 798. But see
id. at 803 n.8 (Bork, J., concurring) (calling the political question doctrine "murky"
and "unsettled"). Nevertheless, even if the contours of the political question doctrine
are not precisely defined, the doctrine has been narrowly applied. The act of state
doctrine, on the other hand, has been broadly applied, despite the courts' lack of under-
standing of it.
See 369 U.S. at 209-17.
388 Id. at 210.
388 See id. at 211.
387 See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981) (Matters related to foreign policy
may be subject to court review.); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692-97 (1974)
(The dispute over the Special Prosecutor's requests for information and President
Nixon's refusal to provide such information did not present a political question.); see
also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (mem.) (only four Justices agreeing
that a challenge by a member of Congress to the President's termination of the Taiwan
treaty presents a nonjusticiable political question).
38 See Langenegger v. United States, 756 F.2d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir.) (finding
that claim for wrongful taking of plaintiff's property in El Salvador arising out of U.S.
assistance in the Salvadoran agrarian reform program did not present political ques-
tion), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 78 (1985); Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d
1500, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (A deprivation of property claim stemming
from American training of Salvadoran soldiers in Honduras did not present a political
question.), vacated mem., 105 S. Ct. 2353 (1985); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,
726 F.2d 774, 796 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring) (stating that the politi-
cal question doctrine did not apply to suits by victims of Palestinian terrorism), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 1354 (1985); Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 705
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heeded the Baker v. Carr language cautioning against overuse of the
political question doctrine, and have limited the use of the doctrine to
relatively clear cases. Indeed, as one commentator has observed,38 9 the
last time that the Supreme Court cited the doctrine in any meaningful
way-other than in connection with the court challenge to President
Carter's authority in the Taiwan treaty case3g°-was in 1973,91 and
the last time the Court relied squarely on the doctrine was in 1946.392
Thus, the political question doctrine has both a limited and cautious
heritage, and it is unlikely to undergo a radical expansion following an
abolition of the act of state doctrine.
IV. LEGISLATIVE EFFORTS TO AMEND THE
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
One indication that the act of state doctrine is in disfavor is the
various attempts undertaken over the years to limit its use. Congress,
recognizing the numerous problems created by the doctrine, has at-
tempted to impose strict limitations on its application. The American
Bar Association also has proposed modifications to the doctrine. These
attempts have thus far met with virtually no success.
A. The Hickenlooper Amendment
In reaction to the Sabbatino decision, Congress in 1964 enacted
the Hickenlooper amendment, 93 sometimes called the Sabbatino
F.2d 1030, 1047 (9th Cir.) (The political question doctrine did not apply to suits be-
tween private parties involving private commercial activity, even though both United
States and Canadian governments were intimately involved with the activity.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 849 (1983).
389 See McGowan, Congressmen in Court: The New Plaintiffs, 15 GA. L. REV.
241, 256-57 (1981), cited in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring); see also Henkin, Is There a "Political
Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
$90 See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (mem.) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring in judgment).
391 See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (involving policies of the Na-
tional Guard).
391 See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (assessing the validity of state
law governing the apportionment of congressional districts).
39' The Amendment was added to a foreign aid bill and promulgated as part of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-633, § 301(d)(4), 78 Stat. 1009,
1012-13 (1964) (current version at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982)). Named after its
chief sponsor, Senator Hickenlooper, it is sometimes called the second Hickenlooper
amendment, see, e.g., J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, supra note 61, at 390, to
distinguish it from the first Hickenlooper amendment. The first Hickenlooper amend-
ment was passed at the same time and directs the President to suspend foreign assis-
tance to countries expropriating property of American citizens without compensation.
See 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1) (1982). Like the second Hickenlooper amendment, the first
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amendment. The amendment provides in relevant part that
no court in the United States shall decline on the ground of
the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on
the merits giving effect to the principles of international law
in a case in which a claim of title or other rights to property
is asserted by any party including a foreign state . . . based
upon (or traced through) a confiscation or other taking . . .
by an act of that state in violation of the principles of inter-
national law . . . .
While at first blush this inartful language would seem to abolish
large parts of the act of state doctrine, the amendment has had almost
no effect on the doctrine. In fact, it has been applied successfully only
once: in the remand of the Sabbatino litigation.3 95 The amendment has
atrophied for several reasons. First, it has been interpreted narrowly to
exclude all contract claims. A claim for breach of contract has been held
not to be a "claim of title or other right to property"; nor is a repudia-
tion of a contract considered a "confiscation or other taking" within the
meaning of the amendment. 98 Second, it has been held inapplicable to
claims made by a foreign state's own nationals.3 9 7 Third, courts have
read the amendment to require that the confiscated property or its pro-
ceeds be located in the United States; claimants cannot lay claim to
other property that is within the United States to compensate for ex-
propriated property abroad. 98 With all these roadblocks, litigants have
Hickenlooper amendment has been of little practical use. Its invocation against Sri
Lanka, for example, had no discernible effect. See J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N.
LEECH, supra note 61, at 392.
3- 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1982).
395 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. de-
nied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968). On remand, the Second Circuit first held that the amend-
ment was constitutional, see id. at 178-83, and then, with the amendment as new au-
thority, ruled against Cuba on the grounds that the Cuban seizure of American assets
violated international law. See id. at 183. For further discussion of the Sabbatino litiga-
tion, see supra notes 50-63 and accompanying text.
398 See Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355, 1372 (2d Cir. 1973), rev'd on
other grounds sub nom. Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S.
682, 688 (1976); Occidental of Umm Al Qaywayn, Inc. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 396 F.
Supp. 461, 472 (W.D. La. 1975).
'" See F. Palicio y Compania, S.A. v. Brush, 256 F. Supp. 481, 487 (S.D.N.Y.
1966), affd per curiam, 375 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 830 (1967);
Present v. United States Life Ins. Co., 96 N.J. Super. 285, 303-04, 232 A.2d 863, 873
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1967), affd per curiam, 51 N.J. 407, 241 A.2d 237 (1968).
398 See Compania de Gas de Nuevo Laredo, S.A. v. Entex, Inc., 686 F.2d 322,
327 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1041 (1983); Empresa Cubana Ex-
portadora de Azucar y Sus Derividados v. Lamborn & Co., 652 F.2d 231, 237 (2d Cir.
1981); see also RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 429 note 4 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1983). But see Ramirez de Arellano
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generally abandoned the amendment as a means of avoiding the act of
state doctrine.
B. The Mathias Bill
In 1981, Senator Charles Mathias, Jr., introduced a bill in the
United States Senate proposing to limit the application of the act of
state doctrine."'9 The Mathias bill, titled the International Rule of Law
Act,400 attempted to eliminate the doctrine in cases in which the foreign
act of state is, in the court's view, "contrary to international law."40
To guide courts in making this determination, the bill directed them to
article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, which
lists applicable sources of international law.402
In its other provisions, the bill explicitly retained the foreign sov-
ereign compulsion doctrine and implicitly retained the other defenses
available in foreign transaction cases, such as the political question doc-
trine and forum non conveniens. The bill provided explicitly for the
abolishment of the narrower, clearly ineffective Hickenlooper
amendment.
40 3
Extensive hearings were held on the Mathias bill, during which
numerous international law scholars testified to the myriad problems
created by the act of state doctrine.4 0 Despite this persuasive testimony,
the bill failed to make it past the Senate Judiciary Committee.40 5
v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1542 n.180 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc) (refusing to
adopt this interpretation because it would amount to "[g]utting the Amendment"), va-
cated mem., 105 S. Ct. 2353 (1985).
391 S. 1434, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in Act of State Hearings,
supra note 10, at 3, 4.
400 The bill was originally titled the International Judicial Protection Act. See
S. 2633, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). For the original version of the bill, see Mathias,
supra note 2, at 408 n.209.
40' The bill, S. 1434, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), is reproduced in its entirety in
Act of State Hearings, supra note 10, at 3; AcT OF STATE AND EXTRATERRITORIAL
REACH, supra note 336, at 90 app. A; and Note, Limiting the Act of State Doctrine,
supra note 2, at 128 n.136.
402 1947 I.C.J. Acts & Docs. 37, 46, No. 1.
403 See S. 1434, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981), reprinted in Act of State Hearings,
supra note 10, at 3, 5 (referring to the Hickenlooper amendment, 22 U.S.C.
§ 2370(e)(2) (1982)).
4 See Act of State Hearings, supra note 10, at 5-146; see also ACT OF STATE
AND EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH, supra note 336, at 3-29 (describing an American
Bar Association program on the Mathias bill and the act of state doctrine generally).
To spur enactment of his bill, Sen. Mathias wrote an article discussing the problems
created by the act of state doctrine. See Mathias, supra note 2, at 369-71; see also
Note, Limiting the Act of State Doctrine, supra note 2, at 128-33 (analyzing the Ma-
thias bill).
"05 Even if the bill had become law, it is doubtful whether it would have achieved
its intended purpose. As with the second Hickenlooper amendment, courts could have
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C. The American Bar Association Proposal
In August 1984, the American Bar Association approved a propo-
sal, drafted by its international law section, that would add an amend-
ment to the FSIA preventing use of the act of state doctrine in instances
in which sovereign immunity is found lacking under FSIA section
1605(a)(3).40 6 That section denies sovereign immunity to a foreign state
in a case in which "rights in property taken in violation of interna-
tional law are in issue" 407 and the property has some connection with a
commercial activity in the United States. The House Report on the
FSIA defines takings in violation of international law to include nation-
alizations that are not accompanied by "prompt adequate and effective
interpreted the bill out of existence. The bill would have eliminated the act of state
doctrine as a defense only to judicially defined violations of international law, and
courts presumably could have avoided finding such violations. The courts' treatment of
the Hickenlooper amendment suggests that they likely would follow this route. This
would lead, contrary to Senator Mathias's intentions, to continued stagnation of inter-
national law in the United States. See Note, Limiting the Act of State Doctrine, supra
note 2, at 123 n.114 ("The provisions of the [Hickenlooper] amendment illustrate the
risks involved in allowing domestic courts to apply parochial versions of international
law.").
The only effective solution, therefore, is complete abolition of the act of state doc-
trine, leaving the courts no discretion to continue its use. See infra Part V.
406 See Report to the House of Delegates, 1984 A.B.A. SEC. INT'L L. PRAC. 1.
The act of state amendment is one of a group of "cleanup" amendments to the FSIA
that the ABA International Law Section is proposing for unexpected problems that
have appeared during the last seven years of the FSIA's existence. The amendments are
described in two documents: a short four-page "Report," summarizing the amend-
ments, and a longer "Recommendations" document, containing the full text of the
FSIA as it would appear if the amendments were adopted.
In discussing the problems that the act of state doctrine has created for the FSIA,
the Report states:
Experience has demonstrated that the Act's current provisions for adjudi-
cation of expropriation claims against foreign states, principally in Sec-
tions 1605(a)(3) and 1607, fail to provide an adequate remedy for many
Americans who are the victims of foreign expropriations. This is true, in-
ter alia, because many courts have continued to apply the act of state
doctrine as a bar to adjudication of expropriation claims even in the nar-
row circumstances in which jurisdiction is expressly prescribed by law.
Report to the House of Delegates, supra, at 2.
The ABA recommendations include the addition of a new section 1606(b) to the
FSIA that would read as follows:
The federal act of state doctrine shall not be applied on behalf of a foreign
state with respect to any claim or counterclaim asserted pursuant to the
provisions of this chapter which is based upon on expropriation or other
taking of property (including contract rights) without the payment of
prompt, adequate and effective compensation or otherwise is a violation of
international law or which is based upon a breach of contract.
Recommendations on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 1984 A.B.A.
SEC. INT'L L. PRAC. 12.
.07 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1982).
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compensation" or that are "arbitrary or discriminatory in nature."40 8
The ABA proposal may be viewed as another version of the Ma-
thias bill. There are, however, two major distinctions: (1) the Mathias
bill would have created a separate federal statute preventing the use of
the act of state doctrine in cases involving international law violations,
while the ABA proposal seeks to insert such a prohibition directly into
the FSIA; and (2) the Mathias bill would have been applicable to liti-
gation between private parties, while the ABA proposal is limited
strictly to litigation involving foreign sovereigns. In effect, the ABA
proposal seeks to rewrite in stronger terms the statement by the original
FSIA drafters that the act of state doctrine should not apply to cases
already covered by the FSIA.*0 ° The ultimate fate of the ABA proposal
is yet unknown.
41 0
V. A PROPOSED STATUTE TO ABOLISH THE
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
The courts are perhaps in the best position to abolish the act of
state doctrine.411 The courts' past resistance to legislative efforts in this
area, however, suggests that independent judicial action is highly un-
likely. Moreover, an action of this scope would probably require a deci-
sive ruling by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, however, has
been reluctant even to hear cases in this area, and the Justices have
shown a clear lack of consensus on an appropriate solution. Under
these circumstances, a legislative solution appears necessary.
The legislative efforts discussed in part IV have been unsuccessful
408 FSIA HousE REPORT, supra note 155, at 6618.
409 See supra text accompanying notes 313-14.
410 On May 3, 1985, Senator Mathias introduced the ABA proposal in the Senate
as S. 1071, "A Bill to amend the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act." Hearings on
S. 1071 were scheduled for September 1985, see INT'L L. NEWS, Summer 1985, at 3,
but now have been indefinitely postponed, pending the submission of written opinions
on the bill by the Departments of State and Justice. Telephone conversation with
Randy Collins, Office of Senator Mathias (Dec. 18, 1985). The ABA itself recognizes
the difficulties with the bill. "Despite the apparent progress of the Bill over the past
two years, attorneys at the State and Justice Departments reportedly have serious res-
ervations about a number of provisions in the Bill . . . ." INT'L L. NEWS, supra, at 3.
The American Law Institute (ALI) also is currently considering the act of state
doctrine, in its revision of the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States. The current ALI proposal, however, would only maintain the status
quo. See supra note 301 (discussing RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 469, at 361 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1985)).
411 Since the judiciary created the act of state doctrine, the judiciary has the power
to abolish it. Professor Wallace quotes a sarcastic statement made to him by a Depart-
ment of Justice official: "Why should this be for the legislature at all? It is a distin-
guished, dignified doctrine created by the courts, and why shouldn't they solve the
problem?" Wallace, supra note 351, at 5.
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in solving the problems of the act of state doctrine. It is unlikely that
any of the present proposals would have much effect, since they all
allow courts the discretion to continue dismissing cases on act of state
grounds. Effective legislative abolishment412 requires simple language
that unequivocally prohibits all further invocations of the doctrine. The
doctrine could be successfully abolished with the following language:
The act of state doctrine shall not be available as a bar to
consideration of any case on the merits in any court of the
United States.
This language could exist either as a separate statute or as part of
another law, such as the FSIA. Enactment of the provision would re-
quire that the courts invoke other, more precisely defined principles in
order to abstain from cases involving international transactions.
13
412 In MOL, Inc. v. Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, 572 F. Supp. 79 (D. Or.
1983), affd, 736 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 513 (1984), the district
court made the startling pronouncement that because the act of state doctrine has "con-
stitutional underpinnings," as announced in Sabbatino, "Congress would have lacked
the authority to limit the doctrine." Id. at 83. The district court's statement is a good
example of both the misunderstanding that surrounds the doctrine and the undue re-
spect that courts have placed on it. In fact, Congress has already once limited, or more
accurately attempted to limit, the doctrine through the second Hickenlooper amend-
ment, and this congressional action has been upheld by the courts. See Banco Nacional
de Cuba v. Farr, 383 F.2d 166, 178-83 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956
(1968).
The court in Farr suggested, in dicta, that "a total prohibition on the courts,
declaring that they might never resort to the act of state doctrine, might well be uncon-
stitutional as violative of the separation of powers doctrine." Id. at 181. The reasoning
of the court may not be correct. As the Supreme Court explained in Sabbatino, while
the act of state doctrine may have "constitutional underpinnings," "[tihe text of the
Constitution does not require the act of state doctrine; it does not irrevocably remove
from the judiciary the capacity to review the validity of foreign acts of state." Sabba-
tino, 376 U.S. at 423. Even if the Second Circuit were correct, however, it provides
little basis for challenging the proposal set forth in this Article. The court in Farr
clearly distinguished between invocation of the act of state doctrine as "an abstention
policy grounded upon the exercise of judicial discretion" and invocation that is "consti-
tutionally compelled on the ground that the underlying issue [is] a political question."
Id. at 180-81. Finding the Sabbatino litigation to fall within the former category, the
court concluded that the Hickenlooper amendment did not unconstitutionally interfere
with the power of the judiciary.
Following abolishment of the act of state doctrine, courts would still be permitted
to invoke the political question doctrine in those particular instances, if any, in which
abstention is truly compelled by the Constitution. This level of discretion adequately
satisfies the concerns raised in Farr while limiting the courts' ability to abstain from
cases without articulating specific and persuasive justication.
413 The proposed statute already has one prominent supporter on the record. Dur-
ing the hearings on the Mathias bill to limit the scope of the act of state doctrine,
Professor Don Wallace, Jr., director of the Georgetown University International Law
Institute, stated, "Indeed, I would be prepared to support a bill that abolished the act
of state doctrine in its entirety." Act of State Hearings, supra note 10, at 28.
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CONCLUSION
The act of state doctrine is used by courts to avoid deciding inter-
national transaction cases that have some foreign governmental involve-
ment. Courts are hopelessly confused about the meaning and scope of
the doctrine, however, and more often than not use the doctrine simply
to avoid deciding difficult cases. Moreover, the doctrine is applied in-
consistently, and parties structuring an international transaction often
cannot predict whether the doctrine will prevent adjudication of claims
arising from the transaction.
Faced with such confusion with other judicially created doctrines,
courts in the past have abandoned those doctrines in favor of a more
reasoned and principled analysis. The same should be done with the act
of state doctrine: it, too, should be abandoned. In its place, courts can
use doctrines that encompass the same concerns as the act of state doc-
trine, but, 'unlike that doctrine, have reasoned criteria for their
application.
